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I. INTRODUCTION
The claim of unlawful discrimination in the workplace is
neither rare nor recent. But, in recent years, more and more people
injured by employment decisions now assert their legal rights.
Thus, the number of employment disputes has risen sharply. In
many of these cases, the employee claims that the employer has
violated federal and state statutory protections against discrimina-
tion based on race, sex, national origin, religion, handicap, and age.
These forms of discrimination are established by proving a
regulated person' or entity committed an act subject to protection
against a protected class person or persons. An employer who dis-
charges a black employee because of his race falls within this defi-
nition. The most difficult part of a plaintiff's case is proving the
causal connection between the act subject to protection (i.e. dis-
charge) and plaintiff's protected class status (i.e. race). The stat-
utes designate: (1) those persons and entities whose activities are
regulated;2 (2) the acts subject to protection;3 and (3) protected
class status. Statutory law, however, does not reveal how to prove
causal connection. This article explores this issue.
There are three ways to prove causal connection:5 (1) disparate
treatment, (2) disparate impact, and (3) failure to make reasonable
accommodation.' These mechanisms do not apply to every pro-
1. Employers, unions and employment agencies are most frequently designated as reg-
ulated persons. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereafter referred to as
"Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3; Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. § 623; The Montana Human Rights Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (1985).
2. See supra note 1.
3. Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 address every
employment policy or practice that discriminates against employment opportunities. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 and 29 U.S.C. § 623. The Montana Human Rights Act applies to
a similar broad range of employment policies and practices. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-
303, -310, -311, 49-3-201 (1985).
4. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment because of an individual's "race,
color, religion, sex or national origin." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3. The Age Discrimi-
nation Employment Act of 1967 prohibits discrimination in employment because of age. See
29 U.S.C. § 623. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits certain discrimination in employ-
ment because of handicap. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794, 794a.
The Montana Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in state and local govern-
ment employment because of an individual's race, creed, religion, color, national origin, age,
physical or mental handicap, marital status, or sex. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-3-201 (1985).
5. A fourth method, present effects of past discrimination, applies to discriminatory
seniority systems. See International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977);
see also Scarlett v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 676 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1982). A seniority
system is defined in California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598 (1980).
For the distinction between an unlawful present violation and a permissible discrimina-
tion based on present effects of past discrimination, see Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662
(4th Cir. 1984).
6. While these proof mechanisms were developed under federal law and federal law
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tected class status or every cause of action. But often more than
one approach is available, and then a plaintiff may rely on all ap-
plicable proofs.
II. DISPARATE TREATMENT
The most readily understood proof of discrimination is dispa-
rate treatment. Plaintiff alleges simply that members of the pro-
tected class are treated less favorably than unprotected class per-
sons: for example, an employer discharges or disciplines a black
employee for conduct which would have resulted in no or lesser
discipline to a white employee. The difficulty is that the plaintiff
must show that the defendant's alleged unlawful employment
practices were prompted by an impermissible discriminatory mo-
tive.8 It is the necessity to prove that distinguishes the disparate
treatment method of proof from the disparate impact method.
Although the plaintiff must prove discriminatory motive to
show disparate treatment, direct evidence of improper motive is
not required.' Courts have recognized that "direct evidence of dis-
crimination. . . is virtually impossible to produce."10 Seldom can a
plaintiff point to direct evidence of discrimination, such as an em-
ployer's statement that he would "prefer a male to a female." Con-
sequently, a plaintiff must frequently rely on circumstantial evi-
dence. The disparate treatment proof mechanism is, in fact,
premised on the absence of direct evidence of discrimination. Of
course, direct evidence greatly reduces the plaintiff's burden. If di-
will be relied upon in discussing them, they are applicable to litigation brought under the
Montana Human Rights Act. See Martinez v. Yellowstone County Welfare Dep't,
Mont. -, -, 626 P.2d 242, 245-46 (1981). There the court said:
The provisions of Title 49, Montana Human Rights Act, are closely modeled after
Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . and to a lesser degree after
the [federal] Age Discrimination in Employment Act.... [A] considerable body of
law has developed under these federal employment discrimination acts. Due to the
parallel structure of the federal laws and the Montana Human Rights Act, this
Court has examined the rationale of federal case law.
Thereafter the court recognized the disparate treatment and impact proof methods, and
affirmed the application of the disparate treatment method to the case under review.
7. See, e.g., Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1982) (a handicap
discrimination case in which the court discussed how plaintiff could prove discrimination
under either reasonable accommodation or disparate impact. Implicit in the discussion was
that to the extent there was evidence of purposeful discrimination, the plaintiff could have
relied on disparate treatment).
8. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
9. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717 (1983).
10. Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397 (D. Or. 1970), aff'd, 492 F.2d 292
(9th Cir. 1974); Martinez, - Mont. at - , 626 P.2d at 245 (citing Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)); see B. ScHLEi & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAW, 1153-55 (2d ed. 1983).
19861
3
Corbett: Proving and Defending Employment Discrimination Claims
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1986
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
rect evidence is available, the plaintiff need not rely on disparate
treatment." Even when direct evidence is present, however, the
plaintiff will frequently supplement that evidence with circumstan-
tial evidence, rendering the disparate treatment formula useful.
A plaintiff frequently proves disparate treatment with "com-
parative" evidence drawn from the contrasting of similarly situated
persons. Thus, if persons from one race, sex, or ethnic group re-
ceive different treatment from similarly situated persons of an-
other race, sex, or ethnic group and the employer has no adequate
non-racial, non-sexual, or non-ethnic explanation for the treat-
ment, then it is reasonable to infer that protected class status was
a factor in the disparate treatment. A plaintiff may use statistical
evidence to prove disparate comparative treatment.12
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,'3 the United States Su-
preme Court specified the method of proof for a disparate treat-
ment case based on comparative evidence. The Court established a
three-part formula. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. " Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer-defendant,
who must "articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee's rejection."' 5 If the employer-defendant successfully
carries this burden, the plaintiff must then establish that the of-
fered explanation is "pretext."' 6
A. Establishing Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case
The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he burden of estab-
lishing a prima facie case is not onerous . . . . 17 Such establish-
ment "serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates
the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's re-
jection."' 8 "[T]he prima facie case in effect creates a presumption
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the em-
ployee."1 9 The plaintiff's creation of this presumption, by estab-
11. See TWA, Inc. v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613 (1985); Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977); Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985). See
infra notes 67 and 68.
12. Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 1985). The use of statistical
evidence is discussed infra at part III A and accompanying text.
13. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
14. Id. at 802.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
18. Id. at 253-54.
19. Id. at 254.
220 [Vol. 47
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lishing a prima facie case, is crucial in the successful litigation of
an employment discrimination case.
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court stated that a
plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing:
(1) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(2) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants;
(3) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and,
(4) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of com-
plainant's qualifications."0
The Court noted that because the "facts necessarily will vary," the
four-part test "is not necessar[ily] applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations."2 Later cases have demonstrated the
flexibility of the McDonnell Douglas four-part test.
1. Refusal to Hire and Discriminatory Denial of Employment
Opportunities
The four-part test devised in McDonnell Douglas, with some
modifications, works well in cases involving either discriminatory
hiring or denial of employment opportunities to current employees.
The Court has noted the two most common legitimate reasons for
rejecting job applicants: (1) an absolute or relative lack of qualifi-
cations, and (2) the absence of a vacancy in the job sought.22 The
McDonnell Douglas formula for establishing a prima facie case ad-
dresses these legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant. Satis-
faction of the McDonnell Douglas formula creates a presumption
of discrimination.
The most common reasons for denying a current employee an
employment opportunity such as a promotion, pay increase, or
favorable transfer are the same for rejecting a job applicant: abso-
lute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of the alleged
employment opportunity. Thus the McDonnell Douglas formula
provides an appropriate analysis both for job applicants and em-
ployees seeking advancement or other internal employment oppor-
tunities. An analysis of judicial applications of the McDonnell
Douglas formula indicates that the formula can be reduced to the
following:
(1) the employer received an application or the equivalent from a
20. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
21. Id. at n.13.
22. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44.
1986] 221
5
Corbett: Proving and Defending Employment Discrimination Claims
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1986
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
qualified protected-class person; (2) a job vacancy or employment
opportunity existed at the time of the application; and (3) the
person was not selected.
a. The Person Belongs to a Racial Minority
The first requirement of the McDonnell Douglas formula -
that a person be a member of a "racial minority" - is too narrow.
The Court has held that the McDonnell Douglas formula may ap-
ply to all protected-class individuals under Title VII.2 3 The Mc-
Donnell Douglas formula has also been applied to non-Title VII
protected-class statutes.24
b. The Person Applied and Was Qualified for the Job for Which
the Employer Was Seeking Applicants
This requirement mandates the explanation of three separate
elements: an application, from a qualified protected class person,
when the employer was seeking applicants.
(i) Job Application
Clearly, discrimination need not be limited to initial hiring.26
Hence, the alleged discriminatory act need not be related solely to
hiring. It is clear, too, that an application is not necessary when a
potential applicant reasonably believes an application would be fu-
tile. For example, the employer may be well known for past dis-
criminatory practices. 26 The job notice may exclude a protected-
class person, as in "help wanted-female"; the message is that an
application by anyone other than a female would be futile.2 7 Simi-
larly, not all employment opportunities require an application.
When an employer promotes, assigns, transfers, awards employ-
ment benefits to, or withholds them from existing employees, the
employer often bases his decision upon the employee's record
rather than upon an application. 8 Except when an application
would be futile, the protected-class person must apply or satisfy
other legitimate requirements for advancement.
23. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
24. See, e.g., Prewitt, 662 F.2d 292.
25. I.e., promotions, transfers and other employee benefits are also covered. See §
703(a)(1) and (2), Civil Rights Act of 1964.
26. Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324.
27. Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1972).
28. However, an employer may require an application, and the employer has no obli-
gation to canvas employees for their preference before filling an opening. Foster v. Arcata
Assocs., Inc., 772 F.2d 1453, 1463 (9th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 47
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(ii) The Applicant Was Qualified
Some courts have required the plaintiff to prove, by showing
relative or comparative qualifications, that he was as qualified as
the person hired or promoted. Other courts have required the
plaintiff to prove only that he met the threshold qualification re-
quirement or had the basic ability to perform, as proof of absolute
qualification.30 This split is caused, in part, by the statement of the
Supreme Court that under the McDonnell Douglas standards, the
plaintiff proves discrimination by presenting evidence that elimi-
nates "the two most prominent, legitimate reasons on which an
employer might rely to reject the job applicant: an absolute or rel-
ative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job
sought. 3
1
Courts which require the plaintiff to prove relative or compar-
ative qualifications argue that unless the plaintiff shows that his or
her qualifications are commensurate with the qualifications of the
successful applicant, the plaintiff has failed to exclude the possibil-
ity that the successful applicant had superior qualifications and so
failed to establish a prima facie case.3 2 Courts that do not require
relative or comparative proof argue that the Supreme Court in Mc-
Donnell Douglas requires only that the applicant be qualified, and
that "qualified" means absolute qualification, not relative or com-
parative qualifications.3 3
The Supreme Court has not resolved the controversy. The
Court had the opportunity to settle the issue in United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. AikensU4 but chose to avoid
it.
The district court in Aikens held that the plaintiff, an appli-
cant for a managerial position, failed to establish a prima facie case
because he did not prove that he was as or more qualified than
29. Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co., 618 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980) (distinguishing Davis v.
Weidner, 596 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1979) which appeared to hold the opposite); United States
v. Hazelwood School Dist., 534 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Oliver v. Moberly School Dist., 427 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Mo.
1977).
30. Aikens v. U.S. Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1980), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 453 U.S. 902 (1981), on remand, 665 F.2d 1057, 1059 (1981),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Burdine v. Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 450 U.S. 248
(1981); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975); Lynn v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981).
31. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358, n.44 (emphasis added).
32. See supra note 30.
33. See supra note 31.
34. 460 U.S. 711.
1986]
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those chosen.36 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed, holding that the plaintiff need show only that
he possessed the minimum objective qualifications for the job and
any other qualifications that the employer advertised. 6
The Court of Appeals recognized that low level jobs often re-
quire skills or qualifications capable of objective assessment, like
typing or minimum years of experience. When this is the case, a
plaintiff who meets the objective standards is qualified. Alterna-
tively, when the plaintiff sought a "professional or managerial" po-
sition, other subjective qualifications are frequently required. The
Appellate Court stated: "Most abilities of a successful man-
ager-especially the ability to assume responsibility for motivating
and directing other employees-are intangible, and each applica-
tion could bring to the position an enormous variety of life exper-
iences that are relevant. '37
Recognizing the distinction between low level "objective"
qualification jobs and jobs that in part require "subjective" qualifi-
cations, the Appellate Court stated: "At the prima facie stage...
plaintiff [subject to subjective job requirements] may be required
to go beyond a showing of minimum qualifications to demonstrate
that he possesses whatever qualifications or background exper-
iences the employer has indicated are important."" Thus if the job
required both objective qualifications and the subjective qualifica-
tion of "leadership," the plaintiff must establish that he met the
minimum objective qualifications and possessed leadership charac-
teristics or experiences. Plaintiff need not, however, offer evidence
comparing his qualifications to those of the successful applicant.
Aikens presented an excellent opportunity for the Supreme
Court to resolve the controversy between absolute and comparative
qualifications. Unfortunately, the Court failed to resolve the con-
troversy. While the weight of judicial authority 9 and scholarly
comment "° support the use of absolute qualifications, a definitive
answer continues to await Supreme Court resolution.
The difficulty with this approach is that the plaintiff is fre-
35. See Aikens, 642 F.2d at 522-23 (Wilkey, J., dissenting and citing Aikens v. Bolger,
No. 77-0303 (D.D.C. 26 Feb. 1979)).
36. See Aikens, 665 F.2d at 1059.
37. Id. at 1060.
38. Id.
39. See cases supra note 30.
40. Player, The Evidentiary Nature of Defendant's Burden in Title VII Disparate
Treatment Cases, 49 Mo. L. REv. 17 (1984); Note, Relative Qualifications and the Prima
Facie Case in Title VII Litigation, 82 COLUMBIA L. REV. 533 (1982). See supra note 10, B.
SCHLEI, P. GROSSMAN, at 1298 n.32.
[Vol. 47
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quently in a poor position to address relative qualifications until
the employer has presented evidence to support his preference of
the successful applicant over the plaintiff. Before the plaintiff can
address relative qualifications, the employer must offer evidence
showing how he evaluated the relative qualifications of the candi-
dates. Only then is the plaintiff in a position to address relative
qualifications. Prior to the employer's assertion, the plaintiff must
speculate on the employer's rationale or be prepared to address
every conceivable way the employer could have assessed the suc-
cessful candidates. This is truly an unacceptable burden.
Arguably, the plaintiff need not address every conceivable
method defendant could have used in assessing the candidates.
The plaintiff may discover the defendant's rationale and come to
trial prepared to address relative qualifications in the prima facie
case. However, several problems persist in requiring the plaintiff to
rely on pretrial discovery. First, the defendant has no incentive to
cooperate in discovery. While the plaintiff may obtain motions to
compel,41 they only add to the cost of discovery. Even in cases in-
volving a reasonably cooperative defendant, the cost of discovery
can be a major obstacle for many plaintiffs. In some instances, if
the court requires the plaintiff to prove relative qualification, dis-
covery costs would prohibit the suit.
The defendant can argue that the burden on the plaintiff to
engage in discovery is small when compared to the defendant's
burden of presenting an affirmative case when the plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate relative qualifications.4 Certainly, if the
court does not require the plaintiff to establish relative qualifica-
tions as part of the prima facie case, then the defendant must as-
sume the time and expense of showing a legitimate business reason
for the selection. If the court requires the plaintiff to establish rel-
ative qualifications, the cost of discovery may be significant, but if
the court does not require the plaintiff to assume the expense and
inconvenience of establishing relative qualifications, then the de-
fendant will have to present an affirmative case.
Whether the plaintiff must establish relative qualifications as
part of the prima facie case will influence the relative burdens of
the parties, but placing the initial burden of proof on the plaintiff
will significantly undermine his chance to prevail. In every case the
plaintiff would have to assume the financial burden and difficulty
of discovering exactly how the defendant evaluated candidates' rel-
41. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
42. See Aikens, 642 F.2d at 520-25 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
1986] 225
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ative qualifications. But only in those cases where the plaintiff ulti-
mately did not establish relative qualifications would the defend-
ant be unnecessarily required to offer evidence of business reasons.
Even then the law protects the defendant from meritless suits. If
the court determines that the plaintiff's suit is "frivolous, unrea-
sonable or groundless," the defendant may recover attorney's fees4"
and the plaintiff's attorney may be held personally liable for such
fees.44
A separate "qualifications" issue occasionally arises when the
employer rejects a protected-class person without ever considering
his absolute or relative qualifications. In such a case the plaintiff
may establish a prima facie case without even attempting to estab-
lish absolute qualifications."5 For example, when an employer
screens out protected-class individuals, such as women or blacks,
without considering their qualifications, the court deems the pro-
tected-class individuals "qualified" for the purposes of establishing
a prima facie case. In one case, the defendant informed a woman
who responded by telephone to a job advertisement that the posi-
tion had been filled." Later, her husband telephoned for the same
job. The defendant told the husband to submit an application. The
employer questioned neither the woman nor her husband about
qualifications. The employer rejected the wife because she was a
woman, and asked the husband, because he was a man, to submit
an application. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that,
under circumstances "when an employer summarily rejects an ap-
plicant without considering his or her qualifications, those qualifi-
cations are irrelevant to whether the Title VII plaintiff has raised a
prima facie case of disparate treatment."' 7
(iii) Employer Is Seeking Applicants
A position need not be open at the time the plaintiff applies,
nor must the employer be seeking applicants to establish disparate
treatment. If the employer accepts applications, and a position
opens within a reasonable time period, the employer must consider
the applicant.'8 If the employer does not want to keep applications
43. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). Both Title VII (§
706(k)) and the Montana Human Rights Act (MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-509(3) (1985)) pro-
vide for attorney fees to the prevailing party.
44. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766-67 (1980).
45. See, e.g., Ostroff v. Employment Exchange, 683 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1982).
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 188 n.3, 198-99 (4th Cir. 1981)).
48. McLean v. Phillips-Ramsey, Inc., 624 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1980); Phillips v. Joint Leg-
islative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
[Vol. 47
10
ontana Law Review, Vol. 47 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol47/iss2/1
EMPLO YMENT DISCRIMINATION
on file, it should not accept applications until a job opens. If the
employer wants to accept applications in anticipation of job open-
ings but does not want to consider "stale" applications once a job
opens, he need only inform applicants that their applications will
not be considered after a specified period. If the applicant wants to
be considered after the prescribed period, he must submit a new
application.
c. The Plaintiff Is Rejected and the Position Remains Open
Adverse treatment must occur before a plaintiff can claim dis-
crimination. The McDonnell Douglas Court stated that after the
plaintiff is rejected, the position must remain open while the em-
ployer continues to seek applicants. 9 This requirement, however,
is simply too restrictive in most situations. Often the plaintiff ex-
periences discrimination when the job opening closes. Hence, the
plaintiff's prima facie case may be established upon rejection, re-
gardless of whether the position remains open. 0
d. The Generic McDonnell Douglas Formula
A cause of action alleging discriminatory refusal to hire or de-
nial of employment opportunities may be based on a showing of
disparate treatment. A plaintiff can establish disparate treatment
by proving (1) that she, a qualified protected-class person, applied
for employment;5 (2) that a job vacancy or employment opportu-
nity existed at the time of the application or while the application
was "live;" and (3) that the employer did not select her. If the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the de-
fendant "to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection. '52
2. Discharge and Discipline
In a situation involving discharge or discipline of an employee,
the only relevant McDonnell Douglas criteria are that a qualified
protected-class person was (1) discharged or disciplined, or (2)
that his employment was otherwise adversely affected. Of these
49. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
50. Holmes v. Bevilacqua, 774 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1985); Hagans v. Andrus, 651 F.2d
622 (9th Cir. 1981); King v. New Hampshire Dep't of Resources & Econ. Dev., 562 F.2d 80
(1st Cir. 1977).
51. Circuits are split on whether plaintiff must prove absolute or relative qualification.
52. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, quoted in Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 see
also Agarwal v. Regents of Univ. of Minnesota, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 937 (8th Cir. 1986)
(The fact that the plaintiff held job for fifteen years is not dispositive of qualifications).
1986]
11
Corbett: Proving and Defending Employment Discrimination Claims
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1986
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
criteria, "qualification" is generally the most difficult to establish.
The Seventh Circuit has determined that to demonstrate qual-
ifications, the plaintiff must show that he "met his employer's le-
gitimate expectations."'83 The court observed that the plaintiff may
successfully attack the legitimacy of the employer's expectations if
they are "unfair or arbitrary." But the court would not review
"business decisions" such as "whether the company's methods
were sound, or whether its dismissal of. . . [plaintiff] was an error
of business judgment."'
If the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he met the employer's
legitimate expectations, he fails to establish a prima facie case. For
example, suppose that a discharged black plaintiff acknowledges
performance failures but asserts that a similarly situated white em-
ployee would not have been discharged. The black plaintiff demon-
strates he met the employer's "legitimate expectations" by showing
that a white employee with such deficiencies would not have been
discharged. Thus, the plaintiff establishes that the employer's le-
gitimate expectations for white employees are lower than those for
black employees; if the plaintiff were white he would not have been
terminated.
The employer's "legitimate expectation" is the minimmum
performance necessary for an employee to be retained. This level
of performance may be objectively measured by comparing the
plaintiff's performance deficiencies with those of white employees
who have been retained. Similarly, when the employer has previ-
ously established certain minimum legitimate expectations, the
plaintiff may compare his work performance against these
standards.
Frequently, employees cannot discern the employer's absolute
minimum legitimate expectations. This is particularly true where
there are no objective standards, and the employer relies on ob-
scure subjective considerations. For example, if an employer drops
an employee from a training program for performance deficiencies,
the employee may show that she was qualified and establish a
prima facie case, even if she had more deficiencies than any other
trainee, by demonstrating that her performance met or exceeded
53. Huhn v. Koehring Co., 718 F.2d 239, 244 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Kephart v. Inter-
state Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1980) (appendix) (quoting Loeb v. Tex-
tron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)) (emphasis added in Kephart) See also
Agarwal v. Regents of Univ. of Minnesota. 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 937 (8th Cir. 1986)
(The fact that the plaintiff held job for fifteen years is not dispositive of qualifications).
54. Kephart, 630 F.2d at 1223 (appendix) (citing Havelick v. Julius Wile Sons & Co.,
445 F. Supp. 919, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
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the employer's minimum legitimate expectations."
Beyond making some elementary showing of minimum qualifi-
cations, the plaintiff initially may be unable to demonstrate that
she met the employer's legitimate expectations. Until the employer
asserts those expectations and shows how they were applied, the
plaintiff must speculate. The plaintiff generally need not engage in
such guesswork.56 Thus, the plaintiff's prima facie case may involve
nothing more than the establishment of minimum qualifications
followed by the defendant's assertion of the minimum legitimate
expectations and how they were applied to plaintiff. Ultimately,
the plaintiff will have to demonstrate that she met those legitimate
expectations. But a requirement that the plaintiff offer proof of
meeting the employer's legitimate expectations when those expec-
tations were unknown and highly subjective would place an undue
burden on the plaintiff.
B. The Defendant's Burden of Articulating Some Legitimate
Non-Discriminatory Reason for the Plaintiff's Rejection
The burden which shifts to the defendant is not a burden of
proof. Rather, it is a burden of going forward with the evidence or
a burden of production. The burden of proof always remains with
the plaintiff.57 The plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie case
"creates a presumption that the employer discriminated against
the employee."5 8 "If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evi-
dence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption,
the court must enter a judgment for the plaintiff because no issue
of fact remains in the case." 59 Thus, once a prima facie case is es-
tablished, the defendant must state some legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the employee's rejection. The defendant's burden
is to "rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evi-
dence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was pre-
ferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. ' ' 0
The Supreme Court explained that the defendant must:
set forth, through the introduction of admissable evidence, the
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. The explanation provided
must be legally sufficient to justify judgment for the defendant. If
the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption
55. See, e.g., supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
56. See Kephart, 630 F.2d at 1223 (appendix).
57. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53.
58. Id. at 254.
59. Id. (footnote omitted).
60. Id.
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raised by the prima facie case is rebutted and the factual inquiry
proceeds to a new level of specificity . . . . [T]he employer need
only produce admissable evidence which would allow the trier of
fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not
been motivated by discriminatory animus." [But this does not]
require defendant to introduce evidence which in the absence of
any evidence of pretext, would persuade the trier of fact that the
employment action was lawful.6 2
For example, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the de-
fendant moves to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiff failed to estab-
lish a prima facie case and the court denies the motion. If the de-
fendant then responded by offering evidence of the reason for the
plaintiff's rejection, there remains little of the "presumption" of
discrimination that arose from the prima facie case.
In Aikens63 the Supreme Court stated that, once the defend-
ant presents evidence of business reason, "whether the plaintiff re-
ally ... [presented a prima facie case] is no longer relevant," the
"presumption drops from the case," and "the factual inquiry pro-
ceeds to a new level of specificity."6" At this point, absent evidence
of pretext, the trier of fact "has before it all the evidence it needs
to decide whether the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff. '6 5 "In short, the district court must decide
which party's explanation of the employers' motivation it
believes. 66
When a plaintiff introduces direct evidence of discrimination
the McDonnell Douglas standard for rebutting a prima facie case
does not apply. When the plaintiff establishes his case by direct
evidence, the defendant's burden of rebuttal is much heavier. He
must then offer "clear and convincing evidence, 67 or at least a
"preponderance of the evidence."68 The McDonnell Douglas proof
formula assumes the plaintiff's reliance on circumstantial evidence.
If the plaintiff establishes a case based on circumstantial evidence,
the burden of persuasion that shifts to the defendant is light. But
if the plaintiff establishes discriminatory intent with direct evi-
61. Id. at 255, 257 (footnotes omitted).
62. Id. at 257 (emphasis in original).
63. 460 U.S. 711; see also supra notes 9 and 30.
64. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 and n.10).
65. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
66. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
67. E.g., Knighton v. Laurens County School Dist. No. 56, 721 F.2d 976, 978 (4th Cir.
1983) (citing cases).
68. Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 1982). See also
Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613; Muntin v. California Parks and Recreation Dep't, 671 F.2d 360
(9th Cir. 1982).
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dence, then the defendant carries the full burden of rebuttal.
C. The Plaintiff's Establishment of Pretext
The plaintiff may respond to the defendant's evidence of busi-
ness reason by attempting to "demonstrate that the proffered rea-
son is not the true reason for the employment decision ....
Plaintiff may succeed either directly by persuading the Court that
a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer, or in-
directly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence."69 Often the plaintiff may accomplish this
without introducing evidence if, for example, the "plaintiff's initial
evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of the defend-
ant, will suffice to discredit the defendant's explanation."70 A
plaintiff who desires evidence of pretext may rely on several alter-
native methods of proof. The plaintiff may offer (1) direct evidence
of discriminatory intent (if such evidence is available); 71 (2) evi-
dence directly contrary to that offered by the defendant; (3) evi-
dence that the defendant has previously relied on inconsistent or
shifting reasons;72 or (4) evidence of dissimilar comparative treat-
ment (the employer's reason is true but has not been applied to
nonprotected class individuals).73
The plaintiff has many means by which to show pretext.74 The
plaintiff may rely on statistical evidence "to show that a defend-
ant's articulated nondiscriminatory reason or the employment de-
cision in question is pretext. 7 1 Statistical evidence suggesting past
discriminatory conduct can be used by the plaintiff to support in-
ferences of improper motive; for example, that the percentage of
protected-class persons employed by the defendant is dispropor-
tionate to their number in the work force.76 Finally, the existence
of less discriminatory alternatives in the employment decisions can
be used by the plaintiff as some evidence of pretext.
However, merely establishing that the asserted business rea-
son is pretext does not necessarily entitle the plaintiff to judgment.
To prevail, the plaintiff must also establish that the employer in-
69. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05).
70. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10.
71. See supra notes 11, 67, 68 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Andre v. Bendix Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1485 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
73. See, e.g., Corley v. Jackson Police Dep't, 566 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1978).
74. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
75. Diaz v. American Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985), quoted in Lowe
v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986).
76. Peters v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 516 F.2d 447, 450 (5th Cir. 1975); see discussion of
statistics, infra part III A.
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tentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. As the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Clark v. Huntsville City Board
of Education, "[t]he Court thus must not circumvent the intent
requirement of the plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuasion by
couching its conclusion in terms of pretext; a simple finding that
defendant did not truly rely on its proffered reason, without a fur-
ther finding that defendant relied instead on race [protected class
status] will not suffice to establish Title VII liability. ' 77 In Clark,
the defendant board of education hired a white nonemployee over
the plaintiff, a black employee, for a specific job. The plaintiff es-
tablished a prima facie case of discrimination and the defendant
offered evidence that the white nonemployee applicant had supe-
rior qualifications. The plaintiff then offered evidence of pretext. It
demonstrated that the defendant's policy was to prefer minimally
qualified employee applicants for promotion regardless of the rela-
tive qualifications. The trial court concluded that the defendant's
asserted reason of "qualifications" was pretext and awarded judg-
ment to the plaintiff.78
The court of appeals reversed, stating that the district court
"labored under a misapprehension of the legal requirements of
pretext and intentional discrimination in a Title VII disparate
treatment case.' ' 7 The court observed:
The lower court, however, found the defendants did not rely on
* . . [the white applicant's] greater qualifications, it found merely
that defendant's policies did not allow them to rely on ... [his]
superior qualifications. Instead of simply noting that reliance on
• . . [a white applicant's] greater qualifications would be at odds
with the defendants' policies and that defendants therefore prob-
ably did not rely on those qualifications, the court leapt directly
from its interpretation of the policies to a conclusion of inten-
tional discrimination. . . . [The approach of the lower court al-
lowed it] to find initial discrimination by actions inconsistent
with a stated policy without a showing that defendants disre-
garded the policy for discriminatory reasons rather than in a good
faith effort to hire the best person available. Even if defendants
incorrectly believed that their policy allowed consideration of rel-
ative qualification, if they nevertheless based their decision on
... [the white applicant's] superior qualifications and not on
plaintiff's race, they have not violated Title VII.8
77. Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983) (footnote
omitted).
78. See id. at 527.
79. Id. at 529.
80. Id. at 528 (citing cases).
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Although it may appear to be hair-splitting, the analysis of the
appellate court is clearly correct. The trial court must find inten-
tional discrimination. The McDonnell-Douglas three-part formula
is an excellent vehicle for establishing intent, but it is only a vehi-
cle, and its mechanical application may produce insupportable
conclusions.
Some trial courts have been confused, too, by a matter related
to establishment of intent: the order of proof. For example, must
the plaintiff, when placed on notice of the defendant's nondiscrim-
inatory reason for discharge, present evidence of pretext during his
case in chief? One court has held that the plaintiff's failure to do
so created the risk that the defendant could successfully file a mo-
tion to dismiss.8 1 The court found that the defendant, in his open-
ing statement, articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for the employment action. Because plaintiff was on notice of the
allegedly legitimate nondiscriminatory reason prior to and during
the presentation of the case in chief, plaintiff should have re-
sponded to the alleged reason. Otherwise, he faced a motion to
dismiss.
This holding does not comport with Supreme Court require-
ments. The Supreme Court has stated that the defendant's articu-
lation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason requires "produc-
ing evidence. ' 82 The Court further noted that "[a]n articulation
not admitted into evidence will not suffice, [t]hus the defendant
cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to the complaint
or by argument of counsel." 83 Unless the defendant, prior to or
during plaintiff's presentation of the prima facie case, receives
leave of court to introduce evidence regarding the alleged reason
for the action, the plaintiff will not be subject to a motion to dis-
miss upon the conclusion of his presentation. There will be no "ev-
idence" of the defendant's alleged nondiscriminatory reason before
the court.
Yet, the Supreme Court has also repeatedly said that a plain-
tiff may anticipate the defendant's business reason in developing
evidence of pretext during the presentation of his prima facie case.
The court designed the three-part McDonnell-Douglas formula to
address the intent requirement, not to constrain the timing of the
introduction of evidence.
81. See Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp. 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977).
82. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7.
83. Id. at 255 n.9.
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D. Proving Causation-The Mixed Motive Case
It has been recognized that in most disparate treatment cases
that:
proof proceeds on both sides on the premise that one motive only
on the part of the employer-either an illegitimate one (e.g., race)
or a legitimate one (e.g., ability to do the job)-has caused the
adverse action of which the plaintiff complains. It is this type of
case for which ... McDonnell Douglas . . . is designed ...
Typically, the plaintiff will contend that one reason-race-was
operative, the defendant will contend that another single rea-
son-ability to do the job-motivated it, and the trier of fact will
find one reason or the other (but not a combination) to be the
true one. In such a case, the issues of motivation and causation
are not distinctly separated, nor do they need to be. If the plain-
tiff shows the defendant's proffered reason to be a pretext for
race, the case is over. Liability is established, and reinstatement
is ordered (in a discharge case) absent extraordinary circum-
stances. The very showing that the defendant's asserted reason
was a pretext for race is also a demonstration that but for his race
plaintiff would have gotten the job."'
In the mixed motive case, the trier of fact accepts the credibil-
ity of evidence in supporting the defendant's assertion of a legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reason, and the plaintiff demonstrates
that protected class status had a role in the employment decision.
For instance, the plaintiff may not have been the best candidate
but race played a role in the selection. Here the court must apply a
test that accounts for both reasons and reach a decision as well.
Mixed motive cases are not unique to Title VII. Federal courts85
and administrative agencies" have grappled with mixed motive
cases in other contexts.
The Supreme Court has examined actions motivated by both
lawful and unlawful considerations in administrative and legisla-
tive decision-making. In an equal protection challenge to a munici-
pal zoning plan, the Court adopted the "same-decision" test. 7
84. See Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1320-21 (8th Cir. 1985).
85. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(a first amendment retaliatory discharge).
86. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 150, 105 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1980); en-
forced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). The NLRB adopted
the Mt. Healthy test to determine liability under § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act. See also NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
87. The Supreme Court stated:
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially
discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the
challenged decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted to the Village the
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Later, in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle,ss the Court used the "same-decision" test for first amend-
ment retaliatory-discharge cases. The Court stated:
Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon
respondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally pro-
tected, and that this conduct was a "substantial factor"-or, to
put it in other words, that it was a "motivating factor" in the
Board's decision not to rehire him. Respondent having carried
that burden, however, the District Court should have gone on to
determine whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of
the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to
respondent's reemployment even in the absence of the protected
conduct.89
The test requires that an unlawful consideration be a substan-
tial or motivating factor in the decision. If the defendant demon-
strates that he would have reached the same decision even absent
the plaintiff's protected status, the defendant prevails.
All circuit courts which have considered the issue have ap-
proved the same-decision test in Title VII mixed motive cases.90
But these courts do not agree regarding all aspects of its applica-
tion. For example, in Bibbs v. Block,91 a trial court found race to be
a "discernable factor" in the selection process, and held that even
absent the discrimination, the plaintiff would not have gotten the
job. However, the Eighth Circuit determined that:
once the plaintiff has established a violation of Title VII by prov-
ing that an unlawful motive played some part in the employment
burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the
impermissible purpose not been considered. If this were established, the com-
plaining party in a case of this kind no longer fairly could attribute the injury
complained of to improper consideration of a discriminatory purpose. In such cir-
cumstances, there would be no justification for judicial interference with the chal-
lenged decision.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21
(1977) (citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 274) (emphasis added).
88. 429 U.S. 274.
89. Id. at 287.
90. Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720 (1st Cir. 1977); Lewis v. Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1983); Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1984);
Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1982); Smallwood v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984); Martinez v. El Paso County, 710 F.2d 1102 (5th
Cir. 1983); Jack v. Texaco Research Center, 743 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1984); Blalock v. Metals
Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985);
Muntin v. State of California Parks & Recreation Dep't, 738 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1984); Miles
v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867 (11th Cir. 1985); Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1368-74 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (Tamm. J., concurring and citing earlier cases).
91. 778 F.2d 1318.
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decision or decisional process, the plaintiff is entitled to some re-
lief, including, as appropriate, a declaratory judgment, partial at-
torney's fees, and injunctive relief against future or continued dis-
crimination. However, even after a finding of unlawful
discrimination is made, the defendant is allowed a further defense
in order to limit the relief. The defendant may avoid an award of
reinstatement or promotion and back pay if it can prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff would not have been
hired or promoted even in the absence of the proven
discrimination.
This same decision test will apply only to determine the ap-
propriate remedy and only after plaintiff proves he or she was a
victim of unlawful discrimination in some respect.92
The court in Bibbs adopted the test but applied it to the rem-
edy rather than to an initial determination of liability.13 It placed
the burden on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the employment decision would have been the same
absent the discrimination. Other courts have disagreed regarding
whether or not (1) to impose the test at the liability or at the rem-
edy stage,94 (2) to impose the burden on the plaintiff or defend-
ant, 5 and (3) to require the burden of proof to be "preponderance
of the evidence" or "clear and convincing evidence."9 " Given this
split among the circuits, the issue appears ripe for Supreme Court
92. Id. at 1323-24 (footnote omitted).
93. The court recognized that in Mt. Healthy the Supreme Court applied the "same-
decision" test to the initial determination of liability. In rejecting this approach the Eighth
Circuit said:
In the Mt. Healthy group of cases, of course, the Supreme Court's mixed-motives analy-
sis is used to establish the defendant's liability in the first place, not simply to determine
the appropriate remedy. If the defendant establishes that it would have made the same
decision in the absence of the illegitimate factor, it wins the case, and the complaint is
dismissed. Our reading of Title VII is significantly different. In that statute, Congress has
made unlawful any kind of racial discrimination, not just discrimination that actually de-
prives someone of a job. A defendant's showing that the plaintiff would not have gotten the
job anyway does not extinguish liability. It simply excludes the remedy of retroactive pro-
motion or reinstatement.
Id. at 1323.
94. The Third Circuit applies the test at the liability stage (see Lewis, 725 F.2d 910)
and the remedy stage (see Dillon, 746 F.2d 998; but see Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918 (3d
Cir. 1977)). The Ninth Circuit applies the test at the remedy stage (see Muntin, 738 F.2d
1054).
95. The burden is on the plaintiff: see Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d
720 (1st Cir. 1977); Dillon, 746 F.2d 998.
The burden is on the employer, see Smallwood, 728 F.2d 614; Blalock, 775 F.2d 703;
Muntin, 738 F.2d 1054; Miles, 750 F.2d 867; Toney, 705 F.2d 1364 (concurring opinion of
Judge Tamm).
96. Clear and convincing: see Patterson, 696 F.2d 293; Muntin, 738 F.2d 1054; Milton
v. Weinberger, 696 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Preponderance of the evidence: see Smallwood, 728 F.2d 614; Miles, 750 F.2d 867.
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consideration. In the meantime, mixed motive cases will be a
source of continuing conflict.
III. DISPARATE IMPACT
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 97 the Supreme Court established
the disparate impact test for proving employment discrimination.
Unlike cases involving disparate treatment, plaintiffs in disparate
impact cases need not establish motive. To establish a prima facie
case, a plaintiff need merely prove that, in the selection process,
the defendant utilized some criteria which disparately impacted a
protected class to which the plaintiff belongs. The selection criteria
and their application usually appear neutral. But if the criteria
have a discriminatory impact, their use may be unlawful regardless
of the defendant's motive. The Griggs Court stated that Title VII
"proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation "98 "The
touchstone is business necessity."' 99
In Griggs, the employer required that applicants have a high
school degree or pass standardized general intelligence tests as a
condition of employment. The plaintiffs, a group of black appli-
cants, alleged that this criterion discriminated improperly because
more blacks than whites lacked a high school degree or failed the
standardized tests, and that an employee needed neither the de-
gree nor a passing score on the test to perform the job. The plain-
tiffs in Griggs could not establish a disparate treatment prima fa-
cie case because they could not prove that they were qualified.100
Instead, they alleged that the selection criterion itself discrimi-
nated because it had a disparate impact on blacks and was not job-
related.
The Supreme Court determined that the selection criterion,
while neutral on its face, was unlawful when it had a discrimina-
tory, adverse impact on a protected class and was not "related to
job performance. '" 101 Had the employer demonstrated job related-
ness, the plaintiff might have prevailed by demonstrating that
other selection criteria, having less adverse impact, would meet the
97. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
98. Id. at 431.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 434. Because they did not have a high school diploma or passing scores
on the tests, they were not "qualified" within the meaning of the disparate treatment
formula, i.e. they did not meet the employer's job requirements.
101. Id. at 436.
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employer's business purpose. 102
To prove disparate impact, the plaintiff typically tries first to
prove that the selection criteria have an adverse impact on the
protected class of which he is a member. If this can be established,
the defendant must establish that the selection criteria are job-re-
lated. If the defendant establishes job-relatedness, the plaintiff
may yet prevail by demonstrating there exist selection criteria that
meet the employer's purpose but are less detrimental to the plain-
tiff's protected class.
In Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 0 3 the Supreme
Court described this process:
This burden [of establishing the relationship between the selec-
tion criteria and the job] arises, of course, only after the com-
plaining party or class has made out a prima facie case of discrim-
ination, i.e. has shown that the tests in question select applicants
for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different
from that pool of the applicants .... [citation omitted]. If any
employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests are
"job related," it remains open to the complaining party to show
that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesir-
able racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate inter-
est in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship.' '10 4
Although the three-part test set forth in Albermarle was applied to
scored tests, it clearly applies to other neutral selection criteria as
well.105
A. Plaintiff's Demonstration of Adverse Impact
A substantial issue in a disparate impact case is whether
plaintiff can establish that selection criteria had an adverse impact
on the protected class of which plaintiff is a member. Proof of ad-
verse impact is accomplished by statistically comparing the pro-
tected class with the majority class. For example, the Griggs Court
determined that 34% of white applicants and 12% of black appli-
cants had high school diplomas, and that 58% of white applicants
and 6% of black applicants had passed the prescribed intelligence
tests. The plaintiff established a prima facie case based on this sta-
tistical disparity. 10 6
Courts have determined that other selection criteria also yield
102. Id. at 428.
103. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
104. Id. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801).
105. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
106. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
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adverse impact: requiring some minimum height and weight;10 7 re-
quiring certain prior experience;1 08 taking into account only the
last ten calendar years of experience;"0 9 combining the job of biol-
ogy teacher with the job of football coach;110 taking arrest record
into account;"1 taking garnishment experience into account;1 2 tak-
ing into account the number of illegitimate children; 113 and taking
into account the record of criminal convictions. 1 4
1. Relevant Statistical Comparisons: Pass/Fail and Population!
Work Force
Courts have found two types of statistical comparisons perti-
nent to a showing of disparate impact. Pass/fail comparisons are
the simpler type; population/work force are more complicated.
With pass/fail comparisons, the plaintiff compares the success
rate for protected class persons with that of the majority group. In
Griggs, the Court made the following statistical comparisons:
Percentage of White Percentage of Black
Persons Meeting the Persons Meeting the
Selection Critera Selection Requirement Selection Requirement
High School Diploma 34% 12%
Intelligence Test 50% 6%
The plaintiffs established a prima facie case based upon this statis-
tical disparity.
With a population/work force comparison, the plaintiff dem-
onstrates that persons of her protected class are underrepresented
in comparison to their availability. For example, a plaintiff may
demonstrate that 3 % of an employer's work force are blacks, while
blacks make up 10% of the population. The plaintiff's implication
107. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (sex discrimination).
108. See Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1981);
EEOC v. Eazor Express, 499 F. Supp. 1377 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Ross v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 468 F. Supp. 715 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (sex discrimination).
109. Haskins v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
256 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (age discrimination).
110. Civil Rights Div. v. Amphitheater Unified School Dist. No. 10, 140 Ariz. 83, 680
P.2d 517 (1984) (sex discrimination).
111. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), afj'd, 472 F.2d
631 (9th Cir. 1972) (race discrimination).
112. Johnson v. Pike Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (race
discrimination).
113. Davis v. American Nat'l Bank of Tex., 12 FEP Cases 1052 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (sex
and race discrimination).
114. Compare Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 549 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1977) with
Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd 468 F.2d 951 (5th
Cir. 1972) (race discrimination).
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is that, if the employer had not intentionally refused to hire
blacks, then blacks would make up 10% of the work force. In Ha-
zelwood School District v. United States,"' the Supreme Court re-
lied on such a comparison. The Court compared the percentage of
black teachers employed by the defendant school district with the
percentage of black teachers in the relevant population. The Court
found a disparity and remanded the case to the district court.
The complication in using the population/work force statisti-
cal comparison is assuring that the comparisons are appropriate.
Such assurance requires a close look at the relevant population.
For example, in Hazelwood, one concern involved determining the
appropriate population of blacks to compare to a work force group
composed of teachers. Because not all blacks in the general popula-
tion were qualified as teachers and because not all black teachers
were interested in working for the Hazelwood school district, the
population side of the comparison had to be evaluated carefully to
assure that it was an appropriate group to compare to the work
force.
At least six potential data sources may help determine the
population side of the comparison.
(i) General population data
General population data show the total number of protected-
class people in the entire population. The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized general population data as appropriate when the required
job skills are those that "many persons possess or can fairly readily
acquire,"11 6 and the population workforce disparity is "gross. '11 7
Thus general population statistics pertain to questions involving
entry level positions which do not require skill or prior training or
position for which such skills can be readily acquired on the job." 8
But "when special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs,
comparisons to the general population ...may have little proba-
tive value."'1 9 In Hazelwood, the court found that general popula-
tion data are inappropriate to the issue of hiring teachers.
115. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
116. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20.
117. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330 n.12; see also infra note 149 and accompanying text.
118. EEOC v. United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat'l, 615 F.2d 147, 154 n.4 (4th Cir. 1980);
Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1976); Gibson v.
Local 40, Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 543 F.2d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir.
1976).
119. Piva v. Xerox Corp., 654 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Hazelwood, 433
U.S. at 308 n.13).
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(ii) Labor Market Data
Even when the jobs require no skill or training, general popu-
lation statistics may be inappropriate because they include chil-
dren, retired persons not looking for work, military personnel or
others who are out of the labor market. So statistics that reflect
the protected persons in the labor market more accurately reflect
their availability than reliance on general population data.120
(iii) Qualified Labor Market Data
When training or skill is necessary for the position, and the
skill or training cannot readily be acquired on the job, a plaintiff
should supply qualified labor market data.1 21 When the plaintiff
relies on general population data, the defendant may use the re-
fined qualified labor market data to rebut the plaintiff's
statistics. 122
(iv) Qualified and Interested Data
Because all of those people qualified for a given job may not
be interested in it, figures for qualified protected-class persons may
exaggerate the population. For example, not all qualified people
will be interested in the work location, pay, benefits, or other con-
ditions of employment. In such event, the defendant may be suc-
cessful in demanding that the plaintiff produce more refined
statistics.
(v) Actual or Qualified Actual Applicant Flow Data
The question of whether a population group is actually inter-
ested in the job may be answered by using actual or qualified ac-
tual applicant flow data.1 23 Actual applicant flow data reflect those
persons who applied for a position. Qualified actual applicant flow
data reflect those qualified persons who applied for a position. This
data is usually very reliable but may be distorted by inadequate,
excessive or discriminatory recruiting efforts.2 4
120. See, e.g., Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, 565 F.2d 1364, 1381-82 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Gay v.
Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Local 30, 489 F. Supp. 282, 303-04 (N.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 694
F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1982).
121. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 n.13.
122. See, e.g., EEOC v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 445 F. Supp. 223, 241 (D. Del.
1978).
123. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 n.13.
124. EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 297
(N.D. Ill. 1985); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp.
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Actual applicant flow data are most frequently used in pass/
fail comparisons. 12 5 Here the pass/fail comparisons are made for
those individuals who actually applied for the job. When actual ap-
plicant flow data are unavailable or unreliable, "potential" appli-
cant flow data may be used. Potential applicant flow data are gen-
eral population data of a more refined sort that fairly represents
the available labor pool for the job.'26 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has determined that the assumption that general population
figures actually represent potential applicant flow may be inappro-
priate. This is particularly true in regard to positions for which the
general public is not qualified.127
(vi) The Employer's Work Force Data
Non-entry level positions within an organization are fre-
quently filled by promotion. When there is an allegation of dis-
crimination in promotion, the employer's work force is regarded as
the population. The comparison is made between the percentage of
protected-class persons in the pool from which the promotion
could be made and the percentage of protected-class persons pro-
moted. 2 8 The group from which promotions could be made is de-
termined by identifying the work force group that meets eligibility
requirements for promotion such as skill, experience, responsibil-
ity, and the like. 129 A potential problem with relying on work force
data occurs where the employer has historically unlawfully dis-
criminated in hiring for or promoting to this work force group.
2. The Relevant Statistical Geographical Area
The relevant statistical geographical area-that geographic
area from which applicants would come absent the alleged discrim-
ination-affects the use of population/work force and pass/fail
873, 896-97 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (concentrated recruitment in one geographical area, employer
recruiting is focused at whites or employer has a reputation of discriminating); Paxton v.
Union Nat'l Bank, 519 F. Supp. 136, 143 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (use of affirmative action
recruitment).
125. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 585 (1979); Valen-
tino v. U.S. Postal Serv., 511 F. Supp. 917 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd 674 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(use of applicant flow data for pass/fail comparisons in promotions).
126. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 and Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 365-67).
127. See Beazer, 440 U.S. 568.
128. O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1982); Davis v. Califano, 613
F.2d 957, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
129. Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1982); Ste. Marie v. East-
ern R.R. Ass'n, 650 F.2d 395, 400-01 (2d Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Radiator Speciality Co., 610
F.2d 178, 186 (4th Cir. 1979).
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comparisons.130 This area is used in determining the percentage of
the protected-class that comprises the "population" in the popula-
tion/work force comparison and the potential applicant flow for
pass/fail comparisons. For example, when a rural school district
hires a custodian, a legitimate expectation exists that the popula-
tion from which applications or potential applications would come
will be limited to a geographic area in and around the school dis-
trict. That geographic area has its own mix of protected-class indi-
viduals and the school district will select an applicant from this
population. If there are few protected-class members within the
population, it will be more difficult to statistically prove disparate
impact. The greater the number of protected-class people within
the geographic area, the easier it is to prove impact.131 The defini-
tion of the geographic area significantly affects the statistics.
If the job is low paying, potential applicants will probably
come from an area close to the employer. The geographic area for a
school custodian will be relatively small. Conversely, if the position
is high paying, a successful applicant may relocate some distance.
For some positions, relocation may be expected, and interest may
be nation-wide. Factors other than initial salary that may influence
geographic area are the rate of unemployment or underemploy-
ment, the expected salary increase, the availability of public trans-
portation and commuting patterns, 132 the desire to work for a par-
ticular employer,' the defendant's actual recruiting practices, 34
and the addresses of job applicants, 3 5 or, in the absence of this
information, the addresses of current employees.136 However,
where an employer discriminatorily directs his recruiting efforts at
certain geographic areas, the addresses of job applicants and cur-
130. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308; United States v. Iron Workers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544, 551 n.19 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
131. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. 299.
132. United States v. County of Fairfax, Va., 629 F.2d 932, 939-40 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hosp., 466 F. Supp. 783, 790,
794-96 n.9 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1183 n.7 (E.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd, 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981).
133. In Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 312, the court noted that the recruiting effort by com-
peting employers may affect the defendant's ability to recruit.
134. E.g., Quigley v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 74, 81 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 1979)
(Where the defendant recruited nationally, a nationwide geographic area is appropriate.);
Abron v. Black & Decker, Inc., 654 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981) (Defendant recruited beyond its
claimed geographic area.).
135. Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 1982); Markey v. Ten-
neco Oil Co., 439 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. La. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 497, 500-01
(5th Cir. 1981).
136. Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 673 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1982); Donnell v. General Motors
Corp., 576 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978).
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rent employees become irrelevant. This type of employer conduct
may even be evidence of discrimination. 137
3. The Relevant Statistical Time Period
The pass/fail or population/work force statistical comparisons
reflect the impact of the defendant's selection procedures over a
defined period of time. For example, a plaintiff may compare pass/
fail statistics between males and females for the last ten years.1"'
The time period used in the statistical comparison is important in
determining the relevance of the statistics. The most significant
time period for statistical comparisons is defined by the statute of
limitations.3 " Only during this limited period can the defendant's
conduct be determined to be unlawful.1 40 However, statistics
137. Wheeler v. City of Columbus, Miss., 686 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1982); see also supra
note 124 and accompanying text.
138. Previously, courts relied on statistical comparisons focusing on the impact of the
defendant's selection procedure at one point in time. See, e.g., Sethy v. Alameda County
Water Dist. 545 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1976). However, in its 1977 Hazlewood decision,
the Supreme Court focused on statistical comparisons over a period of years. Such time
frame statistics present a more accurate picture of the impact of the defendant's selection
practices on the protected class. See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 14, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 553 F.2d 251, 254-55 (2d Cir. 1977).
139. Where there exists no state or local law forbidding discrimination in employment
for the reasons specified in Title VII, a charge must be filed with EEOC within 180 days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 706(e).
Where there exists a state or local law forbidding discrimination in employment for
reasons specified in Title VII (such as the Montana Human Rights Act), or if a charge is
filed with the state or local agency within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice oc-
curred, a charge must be filed with EEOC within 300 days after the alleged practice oc-
curred or within 30 days after receiving notice that the state or local agency has ended its
proceedings, whichever occurs first. See 42 U.S.C. § 706(e). The statute of limitations for
filing with the Montana Human Rights Act is 180 days. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-501(2)
(1985).
The statute of limitations for the Civil Rights Act §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3) and 1986 is
defined by the most analogous state statute of limitations. See, e.g., Movement for Opportu-
nity & Equality v. General Motors Corp., 622 F.2d 1235, 1241-42 (7th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Johnson v. Railway Express, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975)).
140. In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), the Supreme Court deter-
mined that defendants' unlawful conduct occurring outside the statute of limitations was
equivalent to such conduct occurring prior to the effective date of Title VII. The Court said:
A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal
equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was passed. It
may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the status
of a current practice is at issue, but separately considered, it is merely an unfortu-
nate event in history which has no present legal consequences.
Id. at 558. See also Patterson v. American Tobacco Co. 634 F.2d 744, 752 n.10 (4th Cir.
1980) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 456 U.S. 63 (1982); Movement for
Opportunity and Equality, 622 F.2d at 1241; Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 499 F.
Supp. 427, 444 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd, 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
Moreover, this period may be limited to the period prior to plaintiff's filing of the dis-
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outside the time period defined by the statute of limitations but
prior to the effective date of the statutory protections may be used
as circumstantial evidence of discrimination.1 4 1
4. The Relevant Statistical Disparity
If the plaintiff demonstrates a statistical disparity based upon
appropriate statistical comparisons for the relevant geographical
area and time period, the question becomes whether the statistical
disparity is sufficient to establish that the selection criteria have a
disparate impact. The answer depends on the amount of statistical
disparity; that is, on whether the disparity is statistically
significant.
To be statistically significant, the disparity must not be the
result of chance. There are a number of recognized tests for deter-
mining statistical significance. 2 The three most widely used are:
(1) the 0.05 level of statistical significance; (2) the Hazlewood two
or three standard deviations test; and (3) the four-fifths or 80%
rule.
A 0.05 level of statistical significance means that there is no
more than a 5% possibility that chance is the cause of the dispar-
ity. 4" There is, in other words, a 95% assurance that discrimina-
crimination charge. The rationale is that the defendant's post charge conduct should not be
considered because after the unlawful activity was brought to its attention, defendant may
have ceased acting unlawfully (statistics reflecting this modified course of conduct are irrele-
vant in judging prior conduct) and/or the defendant may attempt to manipulate the statis-
tics by according employment opportunities to the protected class. See, e.g., Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 341-42 and n.23 (protected class hiring after 1971- not relevant); Hameed v. Iron
Workers, Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 512 n.7 (8th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's Inc., 628
F.2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1980), modified and aff'd in part, 657 F.2d 750 (1981); Donnell, 576
F.2d at 1298 n.11. Contra EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1198 (4th Cir.
1981); Croker, 437 F. Supp. at 1197.
141. In Hazlewood, the Court excluded statistics for the period prior to the effective
date of Title VII. Hazlewood, 433 U.S. at 309-10 and n.15. See also Patterson, 634 F.2d at
752 and n.11 (pre-Act discrimination relevant only to establish employment practices con-
tinued after the statutory protections were established).
Statistical evidence from the effective date until the commencement of the relevant
statute of limitations period may be used as circumstantial evidence. See Hazlewood, 433
U.S. at 309 n.15; see also Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1017-18 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
142. In addition to the three tests discussed above, courts may rely upon 3.67% or 1 in
27 under the chi-square test (see Bilingual Bicultural Coalition on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC,
595 F.2d 621, 649 and n.92 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Robinson J., dissenting); the test of
proportions (see Markey, 439 F. Supp. at 233 and n.59), or the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
(see Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1690, 1705 (D.N.M. 1977),
afl'd sub nom. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980)). See D. BALDUS & J.
COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION, chs. 9 and 9A (1980 & Supp.).
143. See Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1272 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981).
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982); see also D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 142, § 9.221 at
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tion is the cause. This test, frequently used by statisticians in
many analyses, has been accepted by the courts.1"
The two to three standard deviations test has also been ap-
plied by the Supreme Court and lower courts in employment dis-
crimination cases. 145 Two standard deviations are approximately
equivalent to the 0.05 level of statistical significance. Three stan-
dard deviations are approximately equivalent to the 0.01 level of
statistical significance, meaning that the chance of disparity is
1%. 146The Equal Opportunity Employment Commission Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures provide a simple
"rule of thumb" procedure for determining significance. Under this
procedure, a plaintiff proves adverse impact if the selection rate
for the protected group is less than four-fifths, or 80%, of the se-
lection rate for the majority group. 147 For example, suppose that
110 individuals-l0 black and 100 white-applied for a particular
position. Suppose further that the employer accepted 3 black and
50 white applicants. The selection procedure would have a dispa-
rate impact on blacks because the rate of acceptance was only 3/5
of the acceptance rate for whites.
Black White
No. of Applicants 10 100
No. accepted 3 50
% rate of acceptance 30% 50%
If the employer had accepted four black applicants then there
would not have been an adverse impact because the selection rate
for blacks would have been 4/5, or 80% of that of whites. The test
is easy to apply, but it has been criticized as being too simplistic
and unreliable. 14 8
308 n.36.
144. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430, 437 (1975); Contreras, 656 F.2d
at 1272; Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224, 384-85 (N.D. Tex. 1980), va-
cated and remanded on other grounds, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 567
(1984).
145. Hazlewood, 433 U.S. at 309-11 and nn.14 and 17 (1977); Hameed, 637 F.2d at
514; Gay, 694 F.2d at 551; Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 544-45 (5th Cir.
1982); American Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d at 1191-92.
146. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 142, § 9.42, at 320.
147. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1981).
148. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Pickens-Bond Constr. Co., 635 F.2d 1341, 1350, 1353-54 (8th
Cir. 1980); Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 102, 498 F. Supp. 952, 966 (D.D.C.
1980), aff'd 702 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in
Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REv. 793, 805-11
(1978) (the test omits crucial differences in sample size and pass rates).
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When the statistical disparity is characterized as "gross"149 or
"substantial,"150 courts have found discrimination without relying
on statistical tests of significance. In recent years, however, courts
have required more sophisticated statistical methods and insisted
on proof of statistical significance. In cases where the statistical
disparity was not significant, courts relied on other evidence to
supplement the statistics. 151
5. The Relevant Statistical Sample Size
In addition to disparity, the size of the sample from which the
plaintiff draws the statistics is fundamental to statistical reliabil-
ity. A small sample will "detract from the value of such evi-
dence.' 52 Courts have refused to rely on the statistics when the
sample size is too small to provide reliable statistical conclu-
sions. 153 Certain statistical methods are more reliable than others
for dealing with a small sample. 154 When no reliable statistical con-
clusion is possible, the statistics, coupled with other evidence, may
nevertheless give rise to an inference of discrimination.155 Finally,
if the brevity of the statistical time period limits sample size, sta-
tistical evidence drawn from outside the critical time period may
provide circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish impact. 5"
B. Defendant's Burden of Establishing Job-Relatedness
Once the plaintiff establishes disparate impact, the defendant
149. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20; Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307; Dothard, 433
U.S. at 330, n. 12; American Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d at 1190.
150. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31 and n.6; Townsend v. Nassau County Medical Center,
558 F.2d 117, 120 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); Green v. Missouri
Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1294 (8th Cir. 1975) (see also supra note 97); Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1371 (5th Cir. 1974).
151. See, e.g., Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1135 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 969 (1981) (Where statistical evidence was inadequate to establish a prima facie
case the court relied on evidence of history of discrimination, subjective decision-making,
selection decisions made by all white supervisors, and failure to comply with employer's own
affirmative action program.); Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 546 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1115 (1981) (reliance on subjective decisionmaking and
direct evidence of discrimination).
152. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20.
153. See, e.g., Knutson v. Boeing Co., 655 F.2d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1981); Contreras,
656 F.2d at 1273 n.4; Eubanks, 635 F.2d at 1349-50.
154. D. BALDUS & J. COHEN, supra note 142, §§ 9.1 and 9A.1.
155. Marsh v. Eaton Corp., 639 F.2d 328, 329 (6th Cir. 1981); Boston Chapter NAACP
v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1019-20 and n.3, 1021 n.6 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom.,
Director of Civil Serv. v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); United States v.
San Diego County, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 402, 410 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
156. See infra part III A 3.
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must demonstrate that the selection criteria are significantly re-
lated to successful job performance or otherwise constitute busi-
ness necessity.15 7 The defendant rebuts the impact of the selection
criteria by offering evidence that the criteria are job-related. For
example, the requirement of a high school education may have a
disparate impact on blacks. If the defendant who hires a police of-
ficer requires applicants to have a high school education, the issue
will be whether a high school diploma is sufficiently job-related.
One of the first questions is the degree of job-relatedness re-
quired to meet the Griggs standard that the criteria "must be re-
lated to successful job performance or otherwise constitute busi-
ness necessity." The Supreme Court has yet to specify what
constitutes compliance with this standard. Lower courts have not
agreed on what constitutes compliance, either. They have charac-
terized the defendant's evidentiary burden by using the terms
"business purpose," "business necessity," and "job relatedness."
Even cases within the same circuit have produced conflicting
standards. 5 '
Requiring the defendant to prove that the selection criteria
are "necessary" is a higher standard than requiring that the crite-
ria be "job-related." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the defendant's burden of proof is to demonstrate that
the selection criteria are "predictive of or significantly correlated
with important elements of work behavior that comprise or are rel-
evant to the job or jobs for which the candidates are being evalu-
ated."' 59 This standard requires more than merely showing that
the selection criteria are "job-related" but less than demonstrating
the criteria to be "necessary" to the enterprise. After reviewing the
legislative history and Supreme Court pronouncements,' the
Ninth Circuit found unsupportable the requirement that a defend-
ant establish the selection criteria to be necessary.' 6 ' The court re-
called the Supreme Court's holding'6 2 in Dothard vs. Rawlinson,6 3
which stated that "a discretionary employment practice must be
shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to sur-
vive a Title VII challenge." The court determined that the Su-
157. Griggs at 426, 431.
158. Contreras, 656 F.2d at 1267.
159. Id. at 1054 (quoting Moody, 422 U.S. at 431 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)), cited
in Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
919 (1981)).
160. Contreras, 656 F.2d at 1277-80.
161. Id. at 1280.
162. Id. at 331-32 n.14.
163. 433 U.S. 321.
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preme Court did not require a showing of necessity. The circuit
court concluded that, while a showing of job necessity is not man-
dated, the defendant must demonstrate something more than mere
job-relatedness. This compromise standard requires that the chal-
lenged criteria be predictive of or significantly correlated with im-
portant elements of work behavior that comprise or are relevant to
the job. Defendant must, therefore, demonstrate a significant cor-
relation between the job criteria and important elements of the
job. A showing that the relative criteria are related or tangential to
elements of the job or that there exists some correlation between
the criteria and job performance is not satisfactory.
It is difficult to demonstrate job-relatedness. Historically, em-
ployers have relied upon selection criteria that may or may not be
job-related. To the extent that these criteria have an adverse im-
pact on a protected class, the employer must be prepared to prove
job-relatedness. As the Supreme Court held in Griggs, the em-
ployer must "measure people for the job rather than people in the
abstract."" 4 Such measurement requires a direct link between se-
lection criteria and job performance.
The EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Proce-
dure provide that it is unlawful to use any selection criteria having
an adverse impact unless it has been validated in accordance with
the Uniform Guidelines or, in very limited circumstances, it has
been demonstrated validation cannot or need not be performed." 5
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized that
while the uniform guidelines "are not mandatory, they are entitled
to great deference. . . and an employer who disregards them must
articulate some cogent reason for doing so and generally bears a
heavier burden than the usual burden of proving job-
relatedness.""'
The Ninth Circuit, relying on the Uniform Guidelines, pro-
vided a three-step procedure for validation:
The employer must first specify the particular trait or character-
istic which the selection device is being used to identify or mea-
sure. The employer then must demonstrate that the particular
trait or characteristic is an important element of work behavior.
Finally, the employer must demonstrate by "professionally ac-
164. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
165. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14 (1985).
166. Contreras, 656 F.2d at 1281 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434); United States v.
City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 430 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Adams v. City of
Chicago, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 913 (5th
Cir. 1973).
1986]
33
Corbett: Proving and Defending Employment Discrimination Claims
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1986
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
ceptable methods" that the selection device is "predictive of or
significantly correlated" with the element of work behavior iden-
tified in the second step.167
1. Validation Methods
The Uniform Guidelines provide three validation methods:
content validation, criterion-related validation and construct
validation.
a. Content Validation
Of the three methods, content validation is the most easily
used. This method applies when the test is almost identical to the
activities required on the job. In content validation, the employer
identifies critical or important aspects of the actual job and tests
the applicant to determine his or her overall proficiency. The Uni-
form Guidelines provide:
[T]o be content valid, a selection procedure measuring a skill or
ability should either closely approximate an observable work be-
havior, or its product should closely approximate an observable
work product. If a test purports to sample a work behavior or to
provide a sample of a work product, the manner and setting of
the selection procedure and its level of complexity should closely
approximate the work situation. The closer the content and the
context of the selection procedure are to work samples or work
behavior, the stronger is the basis for showing contact validity. As
the content of the selection procedure less resembled a work be-
havior, or the setting and manner of the administration of the
selection procedure less resembled the work situation, or the re-
sult less resembles a work product, the less likely the selection
procedure is to be content valid and the greater the need for
other evidence of validity. "
If an employer seeks a secretary, and a job analysis reveals typing
to be a critical or important aspect of the job, the employer could
validate the typing requirement by administering a typing test.
The typing test should resemble the actual work required as
closely as possible.
b. Criterion Validation
Unlike content validation, the criterion validation method
167. Craig, 626 F.2d at 662 (quoting Moody, 422 U.S. at 431).
168. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(C)(4) (1985).
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measures identified aspects of job performance: for example, read-
ing and writing, apart from a setting similar to the actual job. The
employer must demonstrate a positive relationship between test
scores and job performance. When the employer uses the test to
predict job training performance, the test may under some circum-
stances be validated against success in the training program.16
The employer need not test for all the criteria in a given job, but
the courts will closely review the employer's choice of job criteria
to assure that those selected for testing are not discriminatory. 1 0
The Uniform Guidelines provide two criterion validation pro-
cedures, concurrent and predictive.
169. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), a police department relied on a
written test that had a disparate impact on blacks to select recruits for its training program.
It was clear some minimum level of skill was necessary to successfully complete the training
program. The Supreme Court held that a positive correlation between the test scores and
the training program performance was sufficient to validate the test regardless of "whether
the training program itself is sufficiently related to actual performance of the police officer's
task." Id. at 252.
While Davis was not a Title VII case, the principle of test validation against training
programs was thereafter accepted in the Title VII context. United States v. South Carolina,
445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977) (three judge panel), affd without opinion, 434 U.S. 1026
(1978).
Despite the broad language of Davis, the lower courts have limited it to its facts. See
Guardians Ass'n of New York City Police Dep't v. Civil Service Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied 463 U.S. 1228 (1983); Ensley Branch of the NAACP v. Seibels, 616
F.2d 812 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1061 (1980); Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626
F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has said that the Supreme Court in Davis
held that "entry-level tests were justified by the need to weed out those who lacked minimal
skills necessary to successful completion of the training program." Guardians Ass'n, 633
F.2d at 247. Where the test does more than screen the minimally qualified from training it
must be validated against actual job performance. Id.
Where an employer utilized a test, validated only against the training program, to
screen other than the minimally qualified, lower courts have not sustained validation. For
example, in Seibels, the employer required police officers and firefighters to take and pass a
test. Candidates that passed the test were placed on a list in order of their score, highest to
lowest. As job openings occurred candidates from the top of the list were certified to the
department for final selection. After selection the candidate was required to complete a
training program before being placed on duty.
The test had an adverse impact on blacks. The county argued, based on Davis, that the
test was lawful because of a positive correlation between the test scores and training pro-
gram performance. See Seibels, 616 F.2d at 819.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the test were discriminatory. The court
distinguished Davis on the basis that the test was used to determine the minimum compe-
tence to compete in the training program whereas here test scores were used to determine
ultimate selection.
170. For example, testing firefighters solely for strength and endurance [which will
favor males]. See also Craig, 626 F.2d at 668 (minimum height required by sheriff's depart-
ment); Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1017, cert. denied, 421
U.S. 910 (1975) (firefighters' written test not job-related).
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(i) Concurrent
The concurrent method evaluates the criteria-related perform-
ance of current employees. The employees are tested, and the test
results are compared to their evaluated performance. If the test is
predictive, employees who are evaluated as poor will perform
poorly on the test, and highly evaluated employees will perform
well on the test. While this method of validation is relatively sim-
ple to administer, the courts have noted several problems with its
application. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,' 7' the Supreme
Court struck down the employer's use of general ability tests ad-
ministered to applicants for skilled jobs, holding that the test had
an adverse impact on blacks despite the fact that the validation
study was conducted by an industrial psychologist.
In Albemarle Paper, the supervisors were told to evaluate the
current employees. A general ability test was given to employees,
and their test results were compared to their supervisors' ranking
to determine if there was a correlation. The trial court concluded
that the employer had sustained its burden of proof because there
was a positive correlation for two of the ten job classifications. The
court of appeals determined that the validation study failed to
demonstrate job-relatedness.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court concluded that the
validation study was "materially defective in several respects."'" 2
First, the validation study was not validated for all the skilled lines
of progression for which it was used. Recognizing that the tests had
been validated for some skilled jobs, the Court, relying on the
EEOC Uniform Guidelines, cautioned that "[a] test may be used in
any job other than that for which it has been professionally vali-
dated only if there are 'no significant differences' between the
studied and the non-studied jobs."'73 The employer failed to estab-
lish that there were no significant differences between the skilled
jobs for which the test had been validated and those other jobs for
which it was also used.
The Court also noted that the validation study was flawed be-
cause of the subjective nature of the supervisors' evaluations of the
current employees. The "supervisors were asked to rank employees
by a 'standard' that was excessively vague and totally open to di-
vergent interpretations.' ' 74 The Court said "[t]here is, in short,
171. 422 U.S. 405.
172. Id. at 431.
173. Id. at 432 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)(2) (1974)).
174. 422 U.S. at 433.
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simply no way to determine whether the criteria actually consid-
ered were sufficiently related to the company's legitimate interests
in job-specific ability to justify a testing system with a racially dis-
criminatory impact.'
7 5
The Court found that the employer's validation study was lim-
ited, in most cases, to jobs near the top of the various lines of pro-
gression. Quoting from the Uniform Guidelines, the Court noted:
If job progression structures and seniority provisions are so estab-
lished that new employees will probably, within a reasonable pe-
riod of time and in a great majority of cases, progress to a higher
level, it may be considered that candidates are being evaluated
for jobs at that higher level. However, where job progression is
not so nearly automatic, or the time span is such that higher level
jobs or employees' potential may be expected to change in signifi-
cant ways, it shall be considered that candidates are being evalu-
ated for jobs at or near the entry level. 1 7
The Court then determined:
The fact that the best of those employees working near the top of
a line of progression score well on a test does not necessarily
mean that that test, or some particular cutoff score on the test, is
a permissible measure of the minimal qualifications of new work-
ers entering lower level jobs. In drawing any such conclusion, de-
tailed consideration must be given to the normal speed of promo-
tion, to the efficacy of on-the-job training in the scheme of
promotion, and to the possible use of testing as a promotion de-
vice, rather than as a screen for entry into low level jobs. The
district court made no findings on these issues. The issues take on
special importance in a case, such as this one, where incumbent
employees are permitted to work at even high level jobs without
passing the company's test battery.177
Finally, the Court determined that the employee or "valida-
tion study dealt only with job-experienced white workers, but the
tests themselves are given to new job applicants, who are younger,
largely inexperienced and in many instances non-white. 1 7 8 "The
EEOC Guidelines . . . provide that '[d]ata must be generated and
results separately reported for minority and non-minority groups
whenever technically feasible.' ,179 The Court noted that it may
not have been technically feasible to include the black employees
175. Id. (emphasis in original).
176. Id. at 434 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)(1) (1974)).
177. 422 U.S. at 434 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1607.11 (1974)).
178. 422 U.S. at 435.
179. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(5) (1974).
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within the validation group. Quoting from the Uniform Guidelines,
the Court said:
If it is not technically feasible to include minority employees in
the validation studies conducted on the present work force, the
conduct of a validation study without minority candidates does
not relieve any person of his subsequent obligation for validation
when inclusion of minority candidates becomes technically
feasible. 180
(ii) Predictive
After applicants have been selected and the applicants have
been on the job for a reasonable period, their performance is evalu-
ated. If there is a positive correlation between the test scores and
their job performance evaluations, the test is predictive. Because
the predictive procedure focuses on an applicant pool ostensibly
more free of protected class discrimination than the existing work
force, and because it eliminates the potentially prejudicial aspects
of experience, it may be favored over the concurrent procedure.'6 '
The concurrent procedure, however, is generally acceptable.'82
In large part, the significance of Albemarle Paper is its heavy
reliance on the Uniform Guidelines regarding the employer's need
to validate. Even when the employer's validation method is appro-
priate, the issue turns on the degree of correlation between the se-
lection criteria and job performance. The Guidelines provide that
"there is no minimum correlation coefficient applicable to all em-
ployment situations."'83 The American Psychological Association
has suggested a "very rough guide" to interpretation of correlation
coefficients:
[A] correlation between a single employment test and a measure
of job performance of approximately .20 is often high enough to
be useful and such correlations rarely exceed .50 .... A correla-
tion of .40 is ordinarily considered very good, and most personnel
research workers are usually pleased with a correlation of .30.' 8
180. 422 U.S. at 435 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(1) (1974)).
181. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 13 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1019 (C.D. Cal. 1976); see also League of United Latin American
Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873 (same case).
182. See, e.g., City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415; Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 472 F.
Supp. 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Worthy v.
United States Steel Corp., 616 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1980) (the current procedure acceptable
except where test "puts a premium on experience").
183. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(6) (1985).
184. Brief for Amicus Curiae, United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th
Cir. 1973) (Executive Comm. of the Div. of Indus. and Org'l Psychology, Am. Psychological
[Vol. 47
38
Montana Law Review, Vol. 47 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol47/iss2/1
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Some courts have also adopted a "rule of thumb" standard.185
As a practical matter, however, the degree of correlation depends
on the facts of the case. The greater the adverse impact, the
stronger the required correlation and demonstration of the impor-
tance of the criterion for successful job performance. '86 When an
employer uses the test only to screen out grossly unqualified appli-
cants, a lower correlation may be acceptable. 1 7 The higher the
human and economic risk of failure on the job, the lower the neces-
sary correlation.'88 Courts freely invoke this latter principle in
cases involving airline pilots and bus drivers entrusted with the
safety of human life.'88
Not only must there be a proper correlation between the selec-
tion criteria and job performance, but the correlation must also be
statistically significant. As previously discussed, 90 this assures that
the statistical correlation actually measures what it purports to
and does not represent pure chance.' 9'
Requiring the validation of selection criteria frequently con-
fronts the employer with an extensive, time-consuming process
which, even when conducted by qualified personnel, may be vul-
nerable to attack. If an employer chooses not to validate the selec-
tion criteria on his or her own work force and instead relies on
criteria validated elsewhere, the validation is subject to attack. To
defend the validation, the employer must demonstrate that his
work force is substantially identical to that which was previously
validated.' 9'
Many employers, particularly small ones, are unable to vali-
date selection criteria on their own work force because they do not
have sufficient employee turnover to support acceptable valida-
tion. 193 There is a relationship between sample size and level of
Ass'n).
185. See, e.g., Beecher, 371 F. Supp. at 516, aff'd, 504 F.2d at 1024 n.13.
186. E.g., Guardians Ass'n, 630 F.2d at 105-06; Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 395 F. Supp. 378, 384 (N.D. Cal. 1975); UNIFORM GUIDELIxNs, 29 C.F.R. §
1607.14(B)(6) (1985).
187. E.g., Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 465 F. Supp. 451, 460 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
188. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (C) (1985).
189. E.g., Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 861-63 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied sub nom., Brennan v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 419 U.S. 1122 (1975), (quoting Spur-
lock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972)).
190. See supra part III A 4 and accompanying text.
191. E.g., Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d at 915 n.11 (quoting Brief for Amicus Curiae,
Am. Psychological Ass'n); see also Uniform Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(5) (1985).
192. The general rule is that the relationship must be significant to the 0.05 level of
significance, no more than five chances in a hundred of the relationship having occurred by
chance. 29 C.F.R. § 1607(B)(2) (1985).
193. See Kim v. Commandant, 772 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1985).
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statistical significance. 194 As sample size decreases, the minimum
correlation between selection criteria and performance accuracy to
obtain a .05 level of statistical significance increases. A low level of
employee turnover requires that the correlation between selection
criteria and job performance be particularly strong.
As a consequence, small employers may be financially and sta-
tistically precluded from validating criteria on their own work
force, and adoption of selection criteria from another employer is
risky. The small employer is presented with a difficult situation in
attempting to defend using the criterion method.
c. Construct Validation
Construct validation supports tests measuring psychological
constructs such as intelligence, anxiety, ability to work in certain
environments, comprehension, and motivation. Construct valida-
tion begins with a job analysis to identify the applicable con-
structs. This process must be performed by professionals qualified
to identify such constructs. 195 The second step requires that pro-
fessionals identify a selection procedure to reliably measure the
construct. Although psychologists have long used tests for most
standard constructs, very little case law dealing with construct val-
idation exists. Litigants rarely challenge the results, partly because
the method is not widely used and validation of the tests is well
documented in the professional literature. There are, in any event,
practical advantages to using construct validation. Because con-
struct validation is documented outside the job, the test may be
used with small sample sizes and narrow ranges of scores. As with
criteria validation, however, the plaintiff may challenge the rele-
vance of the construct to actual job performance and question
whether the test actually measures the construct.
2. Validating Subjective Selection Criteria
The analysis in this article has assumed that the defendant
used some objective criteria in the selection process. These criteria
may include scored tests such as those for intelligence, achieve-
ment, reading, writing, mathematical ability, or psychological
make-up, and non-scored objective criteria such as educational
achievement, strength, and agility. But the defendant may also
rely on subjective criteria, such as judgment of an applicant's ma-
turity, self-reliance, ability to get along, and ability as a team
194. See supra notes 152 to 156 and accompanying text.
195. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15(D) (1978).
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player.
The Uniform Guidelines196 apply to any selection procedure
used as a basis for making employment decisions.'97 Thus, they ap-
ply to both objective and subjective selection standards. The
courts have had little difficulty applying the disparate impact anal-
ysis to scored tests and non-scored objective criteria. A defendant's
use of subjective selection criteria, however, has caused the courts
some difficulty. Defendant's use of subjective criteria is not unlaw-
ful per se,' 98 and courts have recognized that selection criteria for
some jobs, particularly supervisory and managerial ones, cannot be
solely objective.'99 On the other hand, the use of subjective criteria
may create ' 0 or strengthen an inference of discrimination.20 ' Some
courts, including the Ninth Circuit Court, have refused to apply
the disparate impact model when the defendant has relied on sub-
jective selection criteria.02 These courts have restricted the dispa-
rate impact model to objective, seemingly neutral criteria such as
height and weight, scored tests, and education. However, because
the selection criteria for most supervisory and professional jobs are
in part subjective and discretionary, a court's refusal to apply the
disparate impact proof model to subjective and discretionary selec-
tion criteria eliminates this method of analysis for a significant cat-
egory of jobs. Some courts apply both the disparate treatment and
the disparate impact model to subjective selection criteria2 0 8 and a
multi-component selection process that includes both objective
and subjective criteria.' °
Courts that have refused to apply the disparate impact
method to subjective and discretionary selection criteria have
196. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
197. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2(C) (1985) (emphasis added).
198. E.g., Hung Ping Wang v. Hoffman, 694 F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1982); Rogers v.
International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1345 (8th Cir.), vacated and remanded on another
issue, 423 U.S. 809 (1975).
199. See Rogers, 510 F.2d at 1345.
200. E.g., Burrus v. United Tel. Co., 683 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1071 (1982).
201. See O'Brien, 670 F.20 at 867.
202. Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20, 22 (4th Cir. 1982); Vuyanich, 723 F.2d at
1202; Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 699 F.2d 760, 763 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983); Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776, 779 (5th Cir. 1983); Talley v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505, 507 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 952 (1984);
AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co.,
768 F.2d 1120, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1985); Mortensen v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822, 824 (10th Cir.
1982).
203. Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982).
204. E.g., Lasso v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 741 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2320 (1985); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985);
Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985).
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made an unnecessarily narrow reading of the Griggs case. As the
Eleventh Circuit Court stated:
In Griggs, the Court indicated that Title VII requires "the re-
moval of artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employ-
ment" which "operate as built-in headwinds for minority groups
and are unrelated to measuring job capability.". . . The Court in
Griggs did not differentiate objective from subjective barriers
and, in fact, the Court made frequent references to "practices"
and "procedures," terms that clearly encompass more than iso-
lated, objective components of the overall process. "05
The Circuit Court went on to say:
Exclusion of such subjective practices from the reach of the dis-
parate impact model of analysis is likely to encourage employers
to use subjective, rather than objective, selection criteria. Rather
than validate education and other objective criteria, employers
could simply take such criteria into account in subjective inter-
views or review panel decisions. It could not have been the intent
of Congress to provide employers with an incentive to use such
devices rather than validated objective criteria.
Similarly, limiting the disparate impact model to situations
in which a single component of the process results in an adverse
impact ignores the situation in which an adverse impact is caused
by the interaction of two or more components. This problem was
recognized in the recent Eighth Circuit decision in Gilbert v. City
of Little Rock, Ark.2 0 6 The court reversed the district court's find-
ing of no discrimination under a disparate impact theory because
"the district court neglected to adequately consider the interrela-
tionship of the component factors and, more specifically, whether
the oral interview and performance appraisal factors . . . had a
disparate impact . "207
Whether or not the analysis of the Eleventh Circuit Court will
prevail must await a decision by the Supreme Court. In the in-
terim, Montana Title VII plaintiffs must rely on disparate treat-
ment in attacking subjective selection standards.
3. Bottom Lining
Because employers need some selection criteria, and because it
is difficult to validate these criteria, many employers continue to
rely on unvalidated criteria. Such employers may attempt to avoid
205. Griffin, 755 F.2d at 1524 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32).
206. 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984).
207. Gilbert, 722 F.2d at 1397-98 see also Regner v. City of Chicago, 40 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1027 (7th Cir. 1986).
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disparate impact suits by assuring, through affirmative action, that
their work force statistically reflects the protected-class popula-
tion. The employer merely selects a sufficient number of protected
class persons to correct any statistical imbalance. Assuring that
sufficient protected class persons survive the selection process re-
gardless of the fact that aspects of the process may have a dispa-
rate impact on protected class members is referred to as "bottom
lining;" in other words, despite the alleged disparate impact of the
selection process, the bottom line results in a statistically fair rep-
resentation of protected class persons. The theory is that if the
plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the bottom line of the selection
process shows an under-representation of his protected class, then
the selection process has no disparate impact.
For a number of years defendants successfully defended
against disparate impact charges by bottom lining. However, in
Connecticut v. Teal,208 the Supreme Court ruled that bottom lin-
ing was not a defense when presented in one form of a multi-com-
ponent process.
In a multi-component process, an employer may reject an ap-
plicant in two ways: (1) once an applicant fails one aspect of the
process, thereafter the employer does not consider him; or (2) even
if an applicant fails one aspect, she continues to compete, and the
employer only makes a selection after all the results from all the
selection criteria are in. In the second form, failure in one selection
criteria does not eliminate the candidate, and that failure can be
counter-balanced by successes on other criteria.
The Supreme Court in Teal 09 held that where an employer
dropped from the selection process a plaintiff who had failed one
criterion, the criterion had a disparate impact on plaintiff's pro-
tected class. The fact that the bottom line of the selection process
showed no statistical disparity for plaintiff's protected class was
not a defense. A five-to-four majority focused on the impact of the
criterion on the individual plaintiff, not on the impact on the pro-
tected class. The dissenters, on the other hand, focused on the pro-
tected class, arguing that under the disparate impact method of
proof, the plaintiff established an inference of discrimination by
demonstrating that the selection process resulted in disparate im-
pact on the protected class. If the plaintiff had not focused on the
protected class but rather on individual treatment, the disparate
treatment method of proof would have been appropriate; but, the
208. 457 U.S. 440; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
209. 457 U.S. at 454-56.
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dissenters argued, plaintiff "cannot have it both ways." 2 0 They
said:
Having undertaken to prove discrimination by reference to one
set of group figures (used at a preliminary point in the selection
process), the plaintiff then claims that non-discrimination cannot
be proved by viewing the impact of the entire process on the
group as a whole. The fallacy of this reasoning-accepted by the
Court-is transparent. It is to confuse the individualistic aim of
Title VII with the methods of proof by which Title VII rights
may be vindicated. The respondent, as an individual, is entitled
to the full personal protection of Title VII. But, having under-
taken to prove a violation of his rights by reference to group
figures, respondent cannot deny petitioner the opportunity to re-
but his evidence by introducing figures of the same kind. Having
pleaded a disparate impact case, the plaintiff cannot deny the de-
fendant the opportunity to show/prove that there was no dispa-
rate impact.2"
The rationale of the majority opinion appears to apply only
where failure of one component of the multi-component selection
process presents a barrier to further consideration." 2 In like man-
ner, when failure is not an absolute barrier but has a major nega-
tive impact on the ultimate decision, bottom lining would be insuf-
ficient evidence.213
C. Plaintiff's Burden of Establishing A Less Detrimental
Alternative
The Court in Albemarle Paper found that where an employer
meets his burden of establishing job relatedness, "it remains open
to the complaining party to show that other tests or selection de-
vices without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve
the employers' legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy
workmanship. '2 14 Despite what appears to be a clear assertion that
a plaintiff has the burden of establishing a less detrimental alter-
native, some lower courts have required the defendant to demon-
strate, as part of job-relatedness, the absence of a less detrimental
210. Id. at 459 (Powell, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 459-60 (Powell, J., dissenting).
212. E.g., Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983);
Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 544 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 1390 (8th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984).
213. E.g., Williams v. City of San Francisco, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885
(N.D. Cal. 1983); Burney v. City of Pawtucket, 559 F. Supp. 1089 (D.R.I.), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 728 F.2d 547 (lst Cir. 1983).
214. Moody, 422 U.S. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801).
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alternative to the selection criteria relied upon.215 The burden
these courts place on the employer in rebutting the plaintiffs'
prima facie case is "business necessity."'216 They reason that if the
selection criteria must be "necessary," by implication there may
not be other selection criteria that could accomplish the asserted
business purpose with less adverse impact. 17 Thus the employer
must demonstrate that there is no less detrimental alternative to
the selection criteria; he must prove a negative: that a less detri-
mental alternative does not exist. This allocation of burden does
not conform with the Supreme Court pronouncements.
The Uniform Guidelines provide that an employer, as part of
the validation study, should include "an investigation of suitable
alternative selection procedures and suitable alternative methods
of using the selection procedure which have as little adverse im-
pact as possible .. "218 The Guidelines also provide that
"[w]here two or more procedures are available which serve the
user's legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy workmanship,
and which are substantially equally valid for a given purpose, the
user should use the procedure which has been demonstrated to
have the lesser adverse impact."' 19 While the Guidelines place the
burden on the employer to seek less detrimental selection criteria,
some authorities claim this burden of investigation is inconsistent
with Albermarle.2 0 This conclusion appears well founded. Because
the Uniform Guidelines apply to almost all selection criteria and
require the employer to validate, they would, in effect, require the
employer to search for and validate less detrimental alternatives.
The Uniform Guidelines would then give the plaintiff the burden
of proving a less detrimental alternative but would require the de-
fendant to investigate and compile the less detrimental alternative
evidence on which plaintiff will rely. In effect, the burden of pro-
ducing the evidence is on the defendant. A plaintiff may merely
inquire through discovery and present at trial what the defendant
has been required to produce and supply. It is indeed questionable
215. E.g., Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 703-04 (8th Cir. 1980); Blake v.
City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980);
Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1974); Pettway v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 244 n.87 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979) (citing
cases). See also EEOC Uniform Selection Guidelines 29 C.F.R. § 1607.
216. E.g., Kirby, 613 F.2d at 703-04 (emphasis added).
217. See, e.g., Contreras, 656 F.2d at 1287 (Tang, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
218. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(B) (1985).
219. Id.
220. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 95 (2d ed.
1983); see also Contreras, 656 F.2d at 1279.
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whether this is the result the Supreme Court intended in assigning
plaintiff the burden of persuasion on the issue of a less detrimental
alternative.
IV. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
The third proof mechanism, reasonable accommodation, spe-
cifically pertains to two protected classes: religion and handicap.
While disparate treatment and disparate impact also apply to
these two protected classes, plaintiffs asserting religion or handi-
cap-based discrimination most frequently rely upon reasonable ac-
commodation as the proof mechanism of choice.
A specific overview of these two protected classes is necessary
to understand this form of affirmative action. Unlike disparate
treatment and disparate impact, reasonable accommodation re-
quires the defendant to take affirmative action to accommodate
the plaintiff's religious or handicap protected class status.
A. Religion
Title VII makes it unlawful for a regulated person to discrimi-
nate against a protected-class person because of his religious be-
liefs22' and practices.222 Initially, no statutory provision required
accommodation. Despite this lack of statutory authority, the 1966
EEOC Religious Discrimination Guidelines prohibited discrimina-
tion on the basis of religion and required that employers affirma-
tively "accommodate to the reasonable religious needs of employ-
ees ...where such accommodation can be made without serious
inconvenience to the conduct of the business. ' '23 This Guideline
eliminated employment practices, many neutral on their face,
which interfered with the exercise of religious practices.224
The Guidelines, amended in 1967, now require the employer
to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of em-
ployees and prospective employees where such accommodation can
be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
221. See infra note 233; see also 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) (1985).
222. See §§ 703 and 704. Initially Title VII prohibited discrimination only against reli-
gious beliefs. However the Act was amended in 1972 to include practices as well as beliefs.
The Montana Human Rights Act enacted in 1974 prohibits discrimination against an indi-
vidual because of his/her "religion." The Human Rights Commission has determined that
"religion" encompasses practices as well as beliefs. See Human Rights Commission Mont.
Admin. R. 24.9.1408 (1983). The Commission adopted the EEOC "Guidelines on Religious
Discrimination." See also Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence, 24 Cal.3d
167, 593 P.2d 852, 154 Cal. Rptr. 907, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 986 (1979).
223. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2), 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966).
224. E.g., Sabbath work, religious clothing or appearance, and religious observances.
262 [Vol. 47
46
Montana Law Review, Vol. 47 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol47/iss2/1
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
business." '225 This standard required the employer to prove that
the accommodation would cause an "undue hardship. 28
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit struck down this
Guideline 2 7 and determined that EEOC lacked the statutory au-
thority to require an employer to make an accommodation. It
found that, even if there were a statutory basis, the requirement
violated the establishment clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.2 28 An equally divided Supreme Court affirmed this decision
without producing an opinion.2 29 Congress subsequently responded
by inserting in Title VII the affirmative duty "to reasonably ac-
commodate . . . an employee's or perspective employee's religious
observances or practices without undue hardship on the conduct of
the employer's business. "230 While the Supreme Court has not spo-
ken on the constitutional issue, lower courts have held the provi-
sion constitutional.231 Even though the reasonable accommodation
provision purportedly applies only to employers, the lower courts
have held that unions are under a statutory duty to accommodate
as well. 232
To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must prove (1) that
the mandated employment practices are contrary to his religious
faith;23 3 (2) that plaintiff informed the defendant of this fact; and
225. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1980).
226. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(c) (1980).
227. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), afl'd, 402 U.S.
689 (1971).
228. See Dewey, 429 F.2d at 334-35.
229. See Dewey, 402 U.S. 689.
230. While the Montana Human Rights Act does not specifically provide for reasona-
ble accommodation it has been so construed. See supra note 222.
231. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by equally di-
vided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 903 (1977); McDaniel v.
Essex Int'l, Inc., 696 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1982); Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers, D.A.L.U.
19806, 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1046 (1981); Anderson v. General Dy-
namics Convair Aerospace Div., 430 F. Supp. 418 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 589
F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1979), on remand 489 F. Supp. 782 (1980), rev'd and remanded 648 F.2d
1247 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982).
232. Nottleson, 643 F.2d at 454-55; Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979), on remand, 22 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas.
1229 (M.D. Ariz. 1979); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978), on re-
mand, 509 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1981), afl'd, 696 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1982); Cooper v.
General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., International Ass'n
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Hopkins, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
233. While Title VII does not define "religion," the federal courts have uniformly
adopted the interpretation of religion found in two conscientious objector cases. Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Plaintiff need only prove (1) that his belief is "religious" in his own scheme of things,
and (2) that it is sincerely held. In Welsh, moral or ethical beliefs which occupy the role of
religion in an individual's life were considered as a religion. Political or social ideologies
1986]
47
Corbett: Proving and Defending Employment Discrimination Claims
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1986
264 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
(3) that the defendant took some adverse employment action be-
cause of plaintiff's continued religious practice, observances, or be-
liefs.23 4 Once the prima facie case is established, the defendant
must show that he or she made a good faith effort to accommodate
the plaintiff's religious practices.' "3 The plaintiff need not have
suggested methods of accommodation2'" and if a defendant's ef-
forts at accommodation were unsuccessful, the defendant must
demonstrate that he could not accommodate the plaintiff without
undue hardship.237 While the defendant must search for methods
to accommodate the plaintiff, he or she need not attempt every
conceivable method of accommodation to establish undue hard-
ship.238 The employer must, however, at least seriously consider
the accommodation and determine that the accommodation would
cause undue hardship. 23 9
The EEOC Guidelines require that "where there is more than
one means of accommodation which would not cause undue hard-
ship, the employer or labor organization must offer the alternative
which least disadvantages the individual with respect to his or her
employment opportunities. ' '240 This does not require the employer
to give priority to plaintiff's preferred method of accommodation.
It only requires that the method chosen have the least adverse im-
pact on the plaintiff's employment opportunities, "such as com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. 2 1
have been determined to be outside the limits of Title VII. Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc.,
368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973).
234. Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 1979); see also An-
derson, 589 F.2d at 401.
235. See Anderson, 589 F.2d at 401.
236. Id.
237. Id; see also Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 1978).
238. See Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir.
1976). For example, in one case, the plaintiff, a job applicant, demanded that the employer
guarantee that she would never have to work on her Saturday Sabbath. The employer, a
bank, normally closed on Saturday and Sunday, rejected the proposal and refused to hire
the plaintiff. In a split decision the Fourth Circuit held that plaintiff's demand never to be
required Saturday work could not be "reasonably" accommodated, and any such accommo-
dation would certainly cause undue hardship. However, more recently, another federal court
held that an employer may not reject an applicant for making a Saturday work exclusion
demand without first determining that accommodation could not be made without undue
hardship. Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977); see also United
States v. City of Albuquerque, 545 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909
(1977).
239. See McGinnis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 512 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (The plain-
tiff, a postal service window clerk refused to distribute draft registration materials. The
court determined the employer made no good faith effort to accommodate where other win-
dow clerks were willing to distribute the materials for her.).
240. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii) (1985).
241. Id.
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One court determined that "[w]here the employer and the em-
ployee each propose a method of reasonable accommodation, Title
VII requires the employer to accept the proposal the employee pre-
fers unless that accommodation causes undue hardship on the em-
ployer's conduct of his business. 2 42 Yet, another court determined
that while "Title VII requires accommodation'. . . [i]t does not
require employers to accommodate to religious practices of an em-
ployee in exactly the way an employee would like to be accommo-
dated .... Nor does Title VII require employers to accommodate
an employee's religious practices in a way that spares the employee
any cost whatsoever. '24 3
Often the most critical issues involve the extent to which the
defendant must accommodate the plaintiffs religious practices and
the point at which the accommodation causes undue hardship. The
Supreme Court addressed this issue in TransWorld Airlines, Inc.
v. Hardison,2" where it determined that an employer need not
bear more than a de minimis cost in making accommodation.
While the Court did not raise the issue of the constitutional estab-
lishment clause, the underlying tone of the opinion was that, had
Congress required the employer to shoulder more than a de
minimis cost, the burden would have been unconstitutional.2 45
In Hardison, employee Hardison's religion prohibited him
from working Saturdays and certain religious holidays. Because the
job classification required someone to work Saturdays and Hardi-
son was second from the bottom in seniority, TransWorld assigned
Saturday work to him. When TWA was confronted with the con-
flict between Saturday work and Hardison's religion, it asked the
union to permit a change in Hardison's work assignment that
would not require Saturday work. The union refused, because the
proposed shift of assignment violated the collective bargaining
agreement's seniority provision.
TWA considered other alternatives for accommodation, such
as assigning Hardinson a four-day work week and having another
employee perform Hardison's Saturday work or arranging a swap
between another employee and Hardison. Ultimately, it rejected
242. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 484 (2d Cir. 1985), appeal
pending.
243. Pinsker v. Joint Dist. No. 28J, 735 F.2d 388, 390-91 (10th Cir. 1984) (The em-
ployee sought additional religious days off with pay. The employer allowed the plaintiff the
time off but without pay.).
244. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
245. The rationale for this conclusion is that the establishment clause prohibits the
government from establishing religion. A statutory requirement that employers must accom-
modate religious practices, under penalty of law constitutes the establishment of religion.
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these alternatives. The first would have required a Saturday-work-
ing employee or supervisor to neglect his or her primary duties in
order to perform Hardison's work. The second would have required
paying premium wages. Shifting another employee or supervisor to
work Saturday or paying premium wages would have resulted in
either lower efficiency or higher costs. The Court concluded that
either would have resulted in more than a de minimis cost and
would have created an undue hardship for TWA.
The Court also concluded that the duty to accommodate does
not require an employer to take steps inconsistent with an other-
wise valid collective bargaining agreement. The Court noted that
section 703(h) of Title VII affords special treatment to seniority
systems. To require a senior employee to work Saturday would de-
prive him of his contractual preference. The Court concluded:
Title VII does not contemplate such unequal treatment .... It
would be anomolous to conclude that by 'reasonable accommoda-
tion' Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift and
job preferences to some employees, as well as deprive them of
their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the
religious needs of others and we conclude that Title VII does not
require an employer to go that far.2"
Lower courts have determined that when an employer makes
no effort to accommodate, '4 7 or when the accommodation could be
made without disruption, "" the employer will be required to ac-
commodate. After Hardison, EEOC amended its Guidelines. The
EEOC took a broad reading of reasonable accommodation. While
recognizing the de minimis cost concept of undue hardship, EEOC
determined that the reasonable accommodation cost on the em-
ployer is relative. "[D]ue regard [will be] given to identifiable cost
in relation to the size and operating cost of the employer and the
number of individuals who will in fact need a particular accommo-
dation. 24 9 The Guidelines state that:
regular payment of premium wages to substitutes ... constitute
undue hardship. Infrequent payment of premium wages for a sub-
stitute or the payment of premium wages while a more permanent
accommodation is being sought are costs which an employer can
be required to bear as a means of providing a reasonable accom-
246. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81.
247. See Wangsness v. Watertown School Dist. No. 14-4, 541 F. Supp. 332 (D.S.D.
1982) (refusal to accommodate for fear it would set a precedent).
248. See McGinnis, 512 F. Supp. 517 (other employees and the union who would bear
the burden of accommodation support the plaintiff's proposed accommodation).
249. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (1985).
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modation. However, administrative costs, "e.g., costs involved in
rearranging schedules and recording substitutions for payroll pur-
poses," necessary for an accommodation will not constitute more
than a de minimis cost.
2 50
250. Id. Title VII includes two exemptions applicable to religious discrimination.
Section 702 provides:
This title shall not apply ... to a religious corporation, association, educa-
tional institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with carrying on by such rorpora-
tion, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982).
When originally enacted the exemption was limited solely to "religious" activities. How-
ever, thereafter Congress removed the "religious" restriction on activities. Thus, on its face
the provision exempts from religious discrimination all activities of religious institutions.
However, such a construction has serious constitutional problems. In King's Garden, Inc. v.
FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974), the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia stated that to exempt religious institutions from religious discrimina-
tion on all of their activities, no matter how secular, would run afoul of the Establishment
Clause. See also Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974 (D. Mass. 1983).
Alternatively, where the activities are legitimately religious in nature, courts have upheld
the exemption. Feldstein, (Christian Science Monitor as a religious activity of the Christian
Science Church); Larsen v. Kirkham, 499 F. Supp. 960 (D. Utah 1980) (a church sponsored
school under Section 703(e)). It is clear the Section 702 exemption applies only in favor of
discrimination based on religion. Thus, while a religious institution may require its employ-
ees to belong to a certain religion, it cannot discriminate against other protected classes.
EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Mississippi
College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); McClure v. Salvation
Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
Accordingly, a religious institution may not generally discriminate in employment
against a woman merely because she is a woman. However, if the religious institution is able
to establish that its religious doctrine mandates discrimiantion against women, the discrimi-
nation is lawful. To hold otherwise would run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d at 1279. While Title VII may prohibit
religious institutions from discriminating against non-religion protected class statuses, the
Free Exercise Clause prohibits such discrimination if the religious institution demonstrates
discrimination is part of church doctrine.
Section 703(e)(2) provides:
[Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter] . .. it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university or other educational
institution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular
religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution or insti-
tution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled
or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, associ-
ation, or society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other
educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propoga-
tion of a particular regligion.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e)(2) (1985).
Like Section 702, this provision is limited to the employment of persons engaged in
nonsecular religious activities or the teaching of religious doctrine, beliefs, or practices.
Thus, a religious affiliated school could not require all custodians to be members of the
faith. Similarly, a church owned and operated college cannot require all faculty members to
be members of the particular religious faith where the faculty members do not attend to the
religious needs of the faithful or instruct students in the whole of religious of doctrine. One
court concluded that while the faculty of a church college is expected to serve as exemplars
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B. Handicap
The federal law prohibiting employment discrimination
against the handicapped requires special attention, because being
handicapped is not a Title VII protected-class status. The federal
employment law addressing discrimination against the handi-
capped is primarily addressed by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,251
the Vietnam Era Veterans Adjustment Assistance Act,252 and the
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 as amended.2 53 These
acts provide a much narrower base of federal protection than Title
VII.
In contrast, the Montana Human Rights Act provides the
handicapped with the same protection accorded other protected
classes; consequently, employment discrimination against the
handicapped within Montana will most often be litigated under
the Montana Human Rights Act. The Montana Human Rights
Commission has adopted the proof mechanism developed by fed-
eral authorities interpreting federal protections.2 54 Thus the proce-
dure described below will be used for both federal and Montana
protections.
Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, is the
operative federal provision prohibiting employment discrimination
against the handicapped.2 55 The provision regulates the conduct of
of practicing Christians, this does not serve to make the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment matters of church administration, and thus purely of ecclesiastical concern. See
Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477.
251. 29 U.S.C. § 701-796 (1985), as amended.
252. 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (1986).
253. 31 U.S.C. § 6716(b) (1982).
254. The Montana Human Rights Act does not specifically provide for reasonable ac-
commodation for handicapped persons but it has been construed to do so. See Snider v.
Gallatin Farmers Co., Commission Case No. AHpE81-1590; Blatter v. General Mills, Com-
mission Case No. HpE81-1580. See also MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.9.1404 (1983).
255. The Rehabilitation Act defines a handicapped person as:
[Any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. For purposes of
sections 793 and 794 of this title as such sections relate to employment, such term
does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current
use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the
job in question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug
abuse would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others. 29
U.S.C.A. § 706(7)(B).
The regulations further amplify this definition. A major definitional problem is whether
the physical or mental impairment "substantially limits one or more of such person's major
life activities" (emphasis added). Major life activities are defined in the EEOC regulations
as "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hear-
ing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(c) (1985) (emphasis
added). The Section 503 OFCCP regulations define major life activities "to include commu-
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three categories of employers: the federal government, federal con-
tractors, and recipients of federal funds. Non-governmental con-
tractor private sector employers are exempt. This limited coverage
in part distinguishes federal protections for handicapped people
from other federally-protected classes and the Montana Human
Rights Act.
Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act requires the federal gov-
ernment to take affirmative action in "hiring, placement and ad-
vancement of handicapped individuals. '2 51 This section is enforced
by EEOC217 regulations which prohibit the federal government
from discriminating against qualified handicapped persons in em-
ployment and require the federal government to take affirmative
action in the hiring, placement and advancement of qualified
nication, ambulation, selfcare, socialization, education, vocational training, employment,
transportation, adapting to housing, etc.. . . [pirimary attention is given to those life activi-
ties that affect employability." Appendix A (emphasis added).
Accordingly, if a person's physical or mental impairment substantially impacts his/her
ability to work he/she is considered handicapped. The question becomes when does an im-
pairment substantially impact a person's ability to work. See Jasany v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff Jasany, a postal employee, suffered from a medical ailment commonly known
as crossed eyes. The primary function of his job was operation of a mail sorting machine.
The operation of the machine resulted in eye strain and he refused to operate the sorter.
The court of appeals said the analysis of a handicapped case involves three elements: (1)
"impairment," (2) "substantial limitation of a major life activity" and (3) "qualified per-
son." Here the court focused on the first two elements.
The court concluded because plaintiff's "condition had never had any effect whatsoever
on any of his activities, including his past work history and ability to carry out other duties
at the post office apart from operation of the [mail sorting machine]" he was not handi-
capped. Id. at 1250. Relying on a frequently cited lower court decision, E.E. Black, Ltd. v.
Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980), the court said, "an impairment that inter-
fered with an individual's ability to do a particular job, but did not significantly decrease
that individual's ability to obtain satisfactory employment otherwise, was not substantially
limiting within the meaning of the statute." Jasany, 755 F.2d at 1248. Quoting another case
the court said, "one particular job for one particular employer cannot be a 'major life activ-
ity.'" Id. (quoting Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632, 636-37 (Utah 1983) (inter-
preting identical language in a state statute) (emphasis in original)). See also Tudyman v.
United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (rejected flight attendant applicant
who exceeded maximum weight because of voluntary body building is not handicapped
where he has no physical impairment and is not substantially limited in any major life activ-
ity). Thus, where the impairment limits only a narrow ban of employment activities the
person may not be considered handicapped. Again, relying on Black, in Jasany the court
suggested that the "factors relevant to determining whether an impairment substantially
limited an individual's employment (include) . . . the number and type of jobs from which
the impaired individual is disqualified, the geographical area to which the individual has
reasonable access, and the individual's job expectations and training." Jasany, 755 F.2d at
1249 (citing Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1100-01).
256. See 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1982).
257. The Rehabilitation Act provides that the procedures and remedies of Title VII
are applicable to Section 501 violations. See § 505(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 794a(1) (1982).
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handicapped individuals.25s
Section 503 of the Act requires federal contractors with con-
tracts in excess of $2,500 to "take affirmative action to employ and
advance qualified handicapped individuals . . . . " The Depart-
ment of Labor Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCCP)
enforces the requirement.259 OFCCP regulations provide that a
specified affirmative action clause must be included in each con-
tract over $2,500. The affirmative action provision, in part, prohib-
its the contractor from discriminating against any qualified handi-
capped applicant or employee and requires him to take affirmative
action "in all employment practices". 26 0
Section 504 of the Act prohibits recipients of federal funds,
federal executive agencies, and the United States Postal Service
from discriminating against any "qualified handicapped individ-
ual. '261 The federal agency that provides the federal assistance 262
258. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.703 and 1613.704 (1985).
259. Under Section 503 an aggrieved handicapped applicant or employee may file a
complaint with OFCCP. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.26(a) (1985). Where OFCCP, either through
complaint, investigation, or compliance review determines a violation, it attempts to secure
compliance. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.28 and 60-741.29 (1985). While this remedy may fulfill the
federal purpose of preventing handicapped discrimination, it does not necessarily remedy
the injury the handicapped person suffered. Moreover, the handicapped person cannot sue
to recover for his/her personal injuries. A majority of the circuit courts have held Congress
did not accord the handicapped plaintiff a private cause of action under Section 503. See,
e.g., Beam v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 679 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1982); Fisher v. City
of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1981); Davis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 662 F.2d 120 (2d
Cir. 1981); Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1981); Simon v. St. Louis County, 656
F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979).
260. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.4 (1985).
261. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
262. The remedies for a violation of section 504 include an administrative termination
of federal funds and a private cause of action.
Section 505 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that "remedies, pro-
cedures and rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be available to
any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of federal assistance or
federal providers of such assistance under section 504 of this act; the Title VI remedy is a
suspension of federal funds." Health and Human Services Title VI regulations (45 C.F.R. §§
80.6 -80.10 (1980) and 45 C.F.R. § 80 (1980)) are applicable to Section 504, 45 C.F.R. § 84.61
(1980).
An aggrieved party may also bring a private cause of action. See Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984); see also Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876
(9th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies prior to commencing the
private cause of action). Regarding the private cause of action, the courts are split on
whether plaintiff is entitled to damages or merely equitable relief (including backpay). See
Darrone, 465 U.S. at 626. Compare Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.) cert. denied,
459 U.S. 909 (1982) (damages are available) with Ruth Ann M. v. Alvin Independent School
Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (limited to equitable relief). It has been determined
that private actions can be maintained against recipients even though the aid received is not
for the primary purpose of promoting employment. See Darrone, 465 U.S. at 631-37.
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enforces section 504.23
Section 501, applicable to the federal government, and Section
503, applicable to federal contractors, require non-discrimination
and affirmative action. The Supreme Court has recognized that the
affirmative language of Sections 501 and 503 requires the defend-
ant to make reasonable accommodation up to the point of undue
hardship." 4 Alternatively section 504, applicable to recipients of
federal funds, merely requires nondiscrimination. However, the
Court determined that, while Section 504 imposes no affirmative
duty, in some instances the failure of a Section 504 defendant to
accommodate may indicate discrimination. The Court said that a
defendant's:
insistence on continuing past requirements and practices might
arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped persons of the
opportunity to participate in a covered program. Technological
advances can be expected to enhance opportunities to rehabilitate
the handicapped or otherwise to qualify them for some useful em-
ployment. Such advances may also enable attainment of these
goals without imposing undue financial and administrative bur-
dens upon a state. Thus, situations may arise where a refusal to
modify an existing program might become unreasonable and dis-
criminatory. Identification of those instances where a refusal to
accommodate the needs of a disabled person amounts to discrimi-
nation against the handicapped continues to be an important re-
sponsibility .... 265
If a handicapped plaintiff attempts to establish a disparate
treatment or disparate impact prima facie case, the plaintiff must
establish he is currently qualified to perform the essentials of the
job. Under the reasonable accommodation standard, the plaintiff
need not demonstrate that he is currently qualified to perform the
job. He need only establish that, except for the handicap, he is
qualified to perform the essential functions of the job and, with
reasonable employer accommodation for the handicap, could per-
form the job. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the job require-
ments present a barrier which could be overcome with reasonable
employer accommodation.
263. The Attorney General is responsible for coordination of enforcement by executive
agencies of section 504. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980).
264. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). See also Admin-
istrative Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (1985) (§ 501) and 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1985)(§ 503).
265. Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 412-13. See also Simon, 656 F.2d
316; Prewitt, 662 F.2d 292; Sisson v. Helms, 751 F.2d 991, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
137 (1985).
1986]
55
Corbett: Proving and Defending Employment Discrimination Claims
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1986
272 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
If plaintiff establishes at least an apparent showing or plausi-
ble reason to believe that job performance is attainable with the
employer's reasonable accommodation, the burden of persuasion
shifts to the defendant. The defendant must then demonstrate
that an accommodation is unreasonable or would cause undue
hardship.2
66
V. CONCLUSION
An understanding of the three proofs of discrimination, dispa-
rate treatment, disparate impact, and reasonable accommodation
is necessary as a foundation for evaluating an employment discrim-
ination claim. They define and focus the inquiry and establish a
method of analysis.
The next step in the evaluation requires an understanding of
the protections accorded each protected class status. The final step
concerns the procedural steps and practical considerations in
resolving such claims. The second and third will be the concern of
future articles.
266. A frequently cited case, borrowing heavily from Title VII procedures, outlined
the method for establishing reasonable accommodation/surmountable barrier.
(1) .. .The disabled claimant, may establish a prima facie case of unlawful dis-
crimination by proving that: (a) except for his physical handicap he is qualified to
fill the position; (b) he has a handicap which prevents him from meeting the phys-
ical criteria for employment .... To sustain this prima facie case, there should
also be a facial showing or at least plausible reasons to believe that the handicap
can be accommodated ....
(2) Once the prima facie case of handicap discrimination is established, the
burden of persuasion shifts to the ...employer . . . . [t]he . . . employer must
then be prepared to make further showing that accommodation cannot reasonably
be made that would enable the handicapped applicant to perform the essentials of
the job adequately and safely; in this regard the . . . [employer] must "demon-
strate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation
of its program ....
(3) ... [tihe burden of persuasion and proving inability to accommodate al-
ways remains on the employer; however, once the employer presents credible evi-
dence that reasonable accommodation is not possible or practicable, the plaintiff
must bear the burden of coming forward with evidence that suggests that accom-
modation may in fact be reasonably made.
Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 309-10.
Much of the litigation has centered on whether the accommodation causes an overdue hard-
ship. See Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. 397 (The accommodation would force
the employer to utilize other employees to perform the plaintiff's duties. Treatment of this
significant issue will be addressed in a subsequent article.)
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